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Subsidizing Technology Competition: China’s Evolving
Practices and International Trade Regulation
Weihuan Zhou† & Mandy Meng Fang††
Abstract: This article contributes to the growing debate about industrial
policies and subsidies, the adequacy of the rules of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and future international negotiations of industrial
subsidies, using China’s practices in the high-tech sector as an illustration.
Through a review of China’s industrial policies in the high-tech sector including
the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025), we show China’s entrenched
commitments and ambitions towards indigenous innovation, technology
independence, and global leadership in key and emerging technologies
especially in strategic sectors. However, we challenge the mainstream view that
the existing WTO rules are inadequate to deal with Chinese subsidies. Based
on a detailed analysis of the general subsidy rules and the relevant Chinaspecific rules, we argue that the current rules create no hurdle to tackling the
major types of technology subsidies in China. Any perceived deficiencies are
not China-specific and can only be addressed by WTO Members via
negotiations. If such negotiations are desirable, then governments should seek
to leverage the impacts of the pandemic and the global (ab)use of subsidies to
generate the political will needed. Drawing on existing proposals for the reform
of WTO subsidy rules, we develop some general principles and approaches to
facilitate future negotiations emphasizing the need to focus on targeting tradedistortive subsidies rather than China, to balance between strengthening subsidy
rules and preserving policy space, to follow economic guidance and data while
accommodating political considerations, and most innovatively, to shift from
the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to a country-specific approach through a
scheduling method whereby an Industrial Subsidy Schedule is created to record
policy objectives, subsidy commitments, and exceptions of each nation.
Cite as: Weihuan Zhou & Mandy Meng Fang, Subsidizing Technology
Competition: China’s Evolving Practices and International Trade Regulation,
30 WASH. INT’L L.J. 470 (2021).

INTRODUCTION
Technological competition is one of the most defining
elements in United States-China trade tensions. China is
unwaveringly committed to a new growth model based on
promoting technological capability and indigenous innovation,
especially in strategic sectors. However, the United States has
considerable concerns about China’s approaches to technological
advancement and the growing challenges that China’s
achievements and ambitions pose to United States’ interests and
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values.1 As a result, the Trump Administration responded with a
series of measures including Section 301 tariffs on a massive list
of Chinese products,2 the ban on the supply of US technology,
hardware, and software to China’s tech giant Huawei,3 the ‘China
Initiative’ to enforce laws against technology theft in all US states,
export controls over ‘foundational’ and ‘emerging’ technologies,
and restrictions on the funding of joint research and development
(R&D) activities with China.4 However, China’s reactions have
been firmly defensive and proactive making continuous efforts to
strengthen, refine, and upgrade policy priorities and strategies in
support of technology-based economic development and digital
transformation.
The race for global technological supremacy by the
world’s two largest trading nations has profound and far-reaching
implications for international trade regulation. The two-year-long
bilateral trade war, with technological competition being one of
the underlying drivers,5 has amply demonstrated the United States’
†
Weihuan Zhou is Associate Professor, Director of Research, and Member of the
Herbert Smith Freehills China International Business and Economic Law (CIBEL) Centre,
Faculty of Law and Justice, UNSW Sydney. Email: weihuan.zhou@unsw.edu.au.
††
Mandy Meng Fang is Assistant Professor, School of Law, City University of
Hong Kong. Email: mengfang@cityu.edu.hk.
We benefited from valuable and insightful comments by our discussions with,
in alphabetical order, Steve Charnovitz, Peter Draper, Henry Gao, Wenwei Guan, Gary
Horlick, Simon Lester, Petros Mavroidis, Bryan Mercurio, Luca Rubini, Robert Staiger,
and Markus Wagner. We are responsible for any errors and omissions.
1
See, e.g., OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO
CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF
1974 (2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF. For a
recent report on China’s technological achievements in a variety of strategic sectors, see
TARUN CHHABRA ET AL., GLOBAL CHINA: TECHNOLOGY, (2020), www.brookings.edu/re
search/global-china-technology/.
2
See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., China Section 301-Tariff Actions and
Exclusion Process, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301investigations/tariff-actions.
3
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Com., Commerce Department Further
Restricts Huawei Access to US Technology and Adds Another 38 Affiliates to the Entity
List (Aug. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/BEJ3-S27H.
4
See BRENDAN THOMAS-NOONE, TECH WARS: US-CHINA TECHNOLOGY
COMPETITION AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR AUSTRALIA 6–15 (2020),
www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/us-china-technology-competition-and-what-it-means-foraustralia.
5
See generally MARIANNE SCHNEIDER-PETSINGER ET AL., US–CHINA
STRATEGIC COMPETITION: THE QUEST FOR GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP,
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shift in trade policy to unilateralism when tackling China-related
problems and the catastrophic damage that shift has inflicted on
multilateralism.6 The United States-China Phase One trade deal
does not address the systemic issues—particularly China’s
industrial policies, subsidies and state-owned enterprises
(SOEs)—that are at the core of China’s technological
development practices.7 As of this writing, it remains to be seen
whether the Biden Administration will take a more moderate and
constructive approach towards China and multilateral cooperation
under the World Trade Organization (WTO).8
The COVID-19 outbreak has imposed unprecedented
pressure on governments to leverage their policy tools to
ameliorate the pandemic’s effects on their citizens. In the pursuit
of economic nationalism, governments have resorted to a wide
spectrum of trade, monetary and fiscal measures—such as export
restrictions, stimulus packages and subsidies—while paying little
attention to the impact that these measures have on trade partners.9
(2019), www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/CHHJ7480-USChina-Competition-RP-WEB.pdf.
6
See generally Daniel C.K. Chow, United States Unilateralism and the World
Trade Organization, 37 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1 (2019).
7
See Economic And Trade Agreement Between The Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, China-U.S.,
Jan. 15, 2020, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongoliataiwan/peoplesrepublicchina/phase-one-trade-agreement/text; see also Weihuan Zhou & Henry Gao, USChina Phase One Deal: A Brief Account, WOLTERS KLUWER: REGULATING FOR
GLOBALIZATION BLOG, (Jan. 22, 2020), http://regulatingforglobalization.com/2020/01/22
/us-china-phase-one-deal-a-brief-account/(summarizing the Phase One Deal by showing
the significance of SOEs as instrument for implementing industrial policies in China for
both recipients and providers of subsidies); see generally ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV.
[OECD], STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AS GLOBAL COMPETITORS: A CHALLENGE OR AN
OPPORTUNITY? (2016), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/stateowned-enterprises-as-global-competitors_9789264262096-en#page1 (explaining the
challenges that SOEs pose to international economic order).
8
See, e.g., Eric Emerson et al., Client Advisory: The US Trade Agenda in the
Biden Administration, STEPTOE GLOB. TRADE POL’Y BLOG (Nov. 10, 2020),
www.steptoeglobaltradeblog.com/2020/11/client-advisory-the-us-trade-agenda-in-thebiden-administration/#more-2010; see Eamon Barrett, Why A Biden Presidency Won’t End
the U.S.-China Trade War, FORTUNE (Nov. 9, 2020), https://fortune.com/2020/11/09/joebiden-us-china-trade-war/;see also POL’Y PLANNING STAFF, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, THE
ELEMENTS OF THE CHINA CHALLENGE (Nov. 2020), www.state.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/11/20-02832-Elements-of-China-Challenge-508.pdf
(discussing
challenges posed by China and possible U.S. responses in the future by U.S. State
Department).
9
See WTO, COVID-19 and World Trade,
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/covid19_e.htm.
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For China, technology becomes even more crucial for economic
recovery and continuous growth, which requires deploying more
resources to promote R&D and build new enabling infrastructure
in strategic sectors. These initiatives will strengthen China’s
commitment to technological advancement and propel its pursuit
towards global leadership in technology and innovation, thereby
further intensifying strategic competition between the United
States and China.10
Many experts and observers have rightly called upon
governments to combat the pandemic through collective action.11
However, the pandemic is not the root cause of the US-China
economic relations crisis or international trade problems generally.
Many fundamental problems predate COVID-19 and will persist
after it.12 When it comes to technological rivalry, one of United
States’ top concerns has been China’s State-led development
model and the provision of significant and extensive subsidies
along with other forms of support to create national champions in
the high-tech sector. 13 Although subsidies are used widely by
governments for various policy goals and constitute an essential
policy tool to stimulate economic recovery during the pandemic,14
there seems to be a shared concern, as highlighted in a series of
US-EU-Japan joint statements about China’s industrial policies
and subsidies due to their size, complexity, and growing global

10
See generally ALEX CAPRI, HINRICH FOUNDATION, STRATEGIC US-CHINA
DECOUPLING IN THE TECH SECTOR (2020).
11
See, e.g., CTR. FOR ECON. POL’Y RESEARCH., COVID-19 AND TRADE POLICY:
WHY TURNING INWARD WON’T WORK (Richard E. Baldwin & Simon J. Evenett eds.,
2020); see, e.g., Barry Eichengreen & Douglas A. Irwin, The Slide to Protectionism in the
Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why?, 70 J. OF ECON. HIST. 871, 894 (2010).
12
See generally Weihuan Zhou et al., Introduction: Rethinking, Repacking and
Rescuing World Trade Law, in RETHINKING, REPACKAGING, AND RESCUING WORLD
TRADE LAW IN THE POST-PANDEMIC ERA (Amrita Bahri et al. eds., forthcoming 2021)
Ch. 1.
13
See, e.g., OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2019 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 30–32 (2020),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2019_Report_on_China%E2%80%99s_WTO_Complia
nce.pdf.
14
See Simon J. Evenett, International Trade Governance: 30 Years after the
Marrakesh Agreement, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, June 10, 2020,
www.cigionline.org/articles/international-trade-governance-30-years-after-marrakeshagreement.
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impact.15 Therefore, it is reasonable to anticipate that such policies
and subsidies will remain central to the heightening US-China
technology competition and international trade rulemaking.16
This article makes several contributions to the ongoing
debate about China’s industrial policies and subsidies, the
adequacy of existing WTO rules, and future international
negotiations of industrial subsidies. Although we use China’s
high-tech sector as an illustration, our discussions and
observations may be applied to other Chinese industries and
subsidies. Likewise, our proposals for future negotiations of
subsidy rules are generally applicable at multilateral and submultilateral levels.
Section I provides an overview of the evolution of China’s
industrial policies in pursuit of technological advancement and
innovation with a focus on the current policies and latest major
developments. It shows China’s entrenched commitments and
growing ambitions towards “indigenous innovation,” technology
independence, and global leadership in key and emerging
technologies, especially in strategic sectors. This section sets the
necessary background for a more detailed analysis of China’s
major subsidies in the high-tech sector and the adequacy of
existing WTO rules to address them.
Section II expounds the typical types of China’s
technology subsidies and the key legal criteria for determining
whether such subsidies may be captured under the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM).17
Contrary to the dominant view that ASCM rules have significant
15
See, e.g., Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep., Joint Statement of the
Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the U.S., Japan, and the EU (May 23, 2019),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/may/jointstatement-trilateral-meeting; see also, e.g., Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep., Joint
Statement of the Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of Japan, the U.S., and the EU
(Jan. 14, 2020), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2020/january/joint-statement-trilateral-meeting-trade-ministers-japan-unitedstates-and-european-union [hereinafter 2020 Joint Statement].
16
See ALAN DUPONT, NEW COLD WAR: DE-RISKING US-CHINA CONFLICT
(2020), www.hinrichfoundation.com/research/white-paper/us-china-trade/new-cold-war/.
17
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869
U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter ASCM]. This agreement elaborates the rules set out in Articles
VI and XVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). See General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A‐11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
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deficiencies in addressing Chinese subsidies, we argue that these
rules do not create any substantive obstacle to tackling the major
types of subsidies being applied in China’s high-tech sector.
Further, in the few circumstances where difficulties may arise,
they occur in relation to all WTO Members and are not Chinaspecific. Arguably, China’s WTO-plus obligations have provided
not only additional tools to address the difficulties in tackling
Chinese subsidies, but also rules that are broad enough to
constrain Chinese government intervention in the economy
generally. Therefore, WTO Members should be encouraged to
increasingly leverage the existing rules when dealing with
Chinese subsidies. Meanwhile, WTO Members should note that
the ASCM is not the sole source of discipline to address State-led
market distortions in China.
Section III engages in the discussion of reforms by
reviewing the major proposals in scholarship and developing
some general principles and approaches for future negotiations of
industrial subsidies. If reforms to the existing subsidy rules are
desirable, they can only be undertaken by WTO Members via
negotiations.18 The widespread use of industrial subsidies during
the pandemic created a golden opportunity for governments to
rethink the issues of subsidies and generate the political will
needed for international cooperation to further develop the
subsidy rules. We argue that the negotiations need to (1) focus on
addressing trade-distortive subsidies in all economies involved as
opposed to being disproportionately focused on China and (2)
achieve a balance whereby future subsidy regulations would not
unduly constrain governments’ capacities to use subsidies for
legitimate regulatory goals. Most importantly, we call for the
creation of country-specific commitments and exceptions via a
scheduling approach, like what has been applied in relation to
tariff concessions and commitments on trade in services. That is,
each WTO Member should have an Industrial Subsidy Schedule
that: (1) records the sectors in which subsidies exist, or may need
to be granted, (2) the policy objective(s) and magnitude of the
subsidies, (3) any upper limit and phase-down or phase-out
periods of existing subsidies, and (4) any foreseeable exceptions.
18
See WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 9 (5th ed. 2015) (“The WTO was born
out of negotiations, and everything the WTO does is the result of negotiations.”).
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This approach would facilitate negotiations as it responds to
countries’ different regulatory priorities and economic, political,
and social situations and constraints in terms of the use of
subsidies, the level of support, etc. especially in the
(post-)pandemic era.
Section IV concludes by reiterating the need to rethink the
efficacy of existing WTO rules in dealing with Chinese subsidies
and to develop new and feasible approaches to the industrial
subsidy negotiations.
I.

CHINA’S HIGH-TECH POLICIES

This section reviews briefly the evolution of China’s
industrial policies in the high-tech sector. There is no
internationally agreed definition of ‘high-tech sector’. 19 Like
other countries, China developed its own high-tech industries,
development goals, supportive policy instruments, and guidance
for policy implementation.
‘Technology modernization’ formed an integral element
of China’s national policy for economic reform and development
as early as 1963,20 which was subsequently incorporated into the
well-known Economic Reform and Opening-Up policy in 1978.21
In 1995, China developed the ‘technology modernization’ strategy
to underscore the vital importance of science and education to
economic growth (i.e., Ke Jiao Xing Guo), which marked the
beginning of national policies consistently prioritized scientific

19
See generally Thomas Hatzichronoglou, Revision of the High-Technology
Sector and Product Classification (OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working
Paper No. 1997/02, 1997), www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/revision-ofthe-high-technology-sector-and-product-classification_134337307632; Johan Schot &
Edward Steinmueller, Three Frames for Innovation Policy: R&D, Systems of Innovation
and Transformative Change, 47 RESEARCH POL. 1554 (2018).
20
周恩来[Zhou Enlai], 1964 年政府工作报告(摘要) [Government Work Report
1964 (Summary)] (effective 1964) www.gov.cn/premier/2006-02/23/content_208787.htm.
The policy is known as the ‘Four Modernizations’ set forth by China’s first Premier Zhou
Enlai.
21
中国共产党第十一届中央委员会第三次全体会议(公报) [Report of the
Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China] (p
romulgated by the Central Comm., 1978) http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/645
63/65371/4441902.html.

JUNE 2021

SUBSIDIZING TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION

477

and technological advancement. 22 The Ninth Five Year Plan
(1996––2000) set out seven key technological areas that have been
refined in subsequent national policies in light of new challenges,
opportunities and priorities. 23 The Tenth Five Year Plan (2001–
05) expanded the scope of strategic sectors and emphasized
technologies of critical importance to national economy and
security and the promotion of their commercial application.24 The
National Medium- and Long-Term Science and Technology
Development Plan for 2006–20, issued by the State Council in
2005, further refined the strategic sectors and put forward, for the
first time, “indigenous innovation” as a national strategy that
aimed to develop China’s own intellectual property rights and
innovative capability. 25 These policy objectives were
subsequently reaffirmed in China’s Eleventh Five Year Plan
(2006-10).26 The Twelfth Five Year Plan (2011–15) launched the
innovation-based growth model and upgraded the policy priorities
in the high-tech sector with an emphasis on fostering “indigenous
innovation” and technological advancement in an updated list of
priority sectors. 27 That policy upgrade paved the way for the
关于加速科学技术进步的决定[The Decision on Accelerating Science and
Technology Development], (promulgated by the Central Comm. and State Council, May
6, 1995) www.gov.cn/test/2009-09/29/content_1429943.htm.
23
关于国民经济和社会发展“九五”计划和 2010 年远景目标纲要 [Ninth FiveYear Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China and
the Outlines of Objectives in Perspective of the Year 2010 (1996–2000)] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. People’s Cong. Mar. 17, 1996, effective Mar. 17, 1996)
www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2001-01/02/content_5003506.htm. The seven areas
included: information technology; biotechnology; new materials; new energy; aviation and
aerospace; and marine technology.
24
关于国民经济和社会发展第十个五年计划纲要 [Tenth Five-Year Plan for
Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China (2001–2005)],
(promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 5, 2001, effective Mar. 5, 2001)
www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2001/content_60699.htm.
25
国 家 中 长 期 科 学 和 技 术 发 展 规 划 纲 要 （ 2006-2020 ） [The National
Medium- and Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan for 2006–2020]
(promulgated by the State Council, Feb. 9, 2006) www.most.gov.cn/mostinfo/xinxifenlei/
gjkjgh/200811/t20081129_65774.htm.
26
中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划纲要 (2006–2010)
[Eleventh Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic
of China (2011–2015)] (promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 16, 2006, effective Mar.
16, 2006) www.gov.cn/ztzl/2006-03/16/content_228841.htm.
27
中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要(2011–2015)
[Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic
22
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promulgation of the ‘Made in China 2025’(MIC 2025), an
ambitious ten-year action plan to develop technological capability
and indigenous innovation in ten strategic industries: information
technology; numerical control tools and robotics; aerospace
equipment; ocean engineering equipment and high-tech ships;
railway equipment; energy saving and new energy vehicles
(NEVs); power or renewable energy equipment; new materials;
medicines and medical devices; and agricultural machinery. 28
These sectors encompass virtually all high-tech industries that
have driven economic growth in advanced economies,29 and they
constitute nearly 40 percent of China’s entire industrial valueadded manufacturing.30 Consistent with the overarching strategy
of “indigenous innovation,” MIC 2025 is aimed at reducing
dependence on foreign technologies, and boosting self-sufficiency
and the internationalization of Chinese home-made technologies
throughout value chains including foundational technologies (e.g.
semiconductors), core technologies (e.g. electric vehicle batteries),
and future technologies (e.g. autonomous driving). 31 The
Thirteenth Five Year Plan (2016–20) further refined the priority
sectors to seven strategic industries: energy-saving and
environmental
protection;
new-generation
information

of China (2011–2015)] (promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 14, 2011, effective Mar.
14, 2011) www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825838.htm. The priority sectors included: clean
energy technology; next-generation information technology; biotechnology; high-end
equipment manufacturing; new energy; new materials; and clean energy vehicles.
28
国务院关于印发<中国制造 2025>的通知 (2015) [Notice on the Printing and
Release of ‘Made in China 2025’ (2015)] (promulgated by the State Council on May 8,
2015, effective May 8, 2015) http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/201505/19/content_9784.htm.
29
Jost Wubbeke et al., Made in China 2025: the Making of a High-Tech
Superpower and Consequences for Industrial Countries 6 (Mercator Inst. China Studies,
Papers on China No. 2, 2016), https://merics.org/en/report/made-china-2025; Max J.
Zenglein & Anna Holzmann, Evolving Made in China 2025: China’s Industrial Policy in
the Quest for Global Tech Leadership 10–11 (Mercator Inst. China Studies, Papers on
China No. 8, 2019), https://merics.org/en/report/evolving-made-china-2025.
30
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MADE IN CHINA 2025: GLOBAL AMBITIONS
BUILT ON LOCAL PROTECTIONS (2017), www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/final_ma
de_in_china_2025_report_full.pdf.
31
中国制造 2025 重点领域技术路线图》[Made in China 2025 Key Technology
Roadmap] (National Manufacturing Strategy Advisory Committee, Oct. 2015),
www.cae.cn/cae/html/files/2015-10/29/20151029105822561730637.pdf.
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technology; biology; high-end equipment manufacturing; new
energy; new materials; and new-energy automobile.32
Like many other countries, the Chinese government
played a critical role developing its high-tech sector.33 The pursuit
of the policy goals envisaged in the Five Year Plans led to the
creation of different science and technology programs, 34 and
supportive measures in various forms like massive investment
funds, policy loans, loan guarantees, preferential tax, and
government procurement policies, and export promotion. By the
end of the Thirteenth Five Year period, China became a global
leader in many emerging technologies ranging from high-speed
railways and NEVs, to 5G networks and artificial intelligence.35
The COVID-19 outbreak strengthened China’s
commitment to technological advancement and innovation as an
essential approach to economic recovery and continuous growth.
For example, a series of initiatives were rolled out, including the
promotion and commercialization of major technology projects to
revitalize economic growth, the expansion of financial support for
high-tech sectors,36 and most notably, the commitment to build

32
中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要(2016–2020)
[Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People’s
Republic of China (2016–2020)] (promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 17, 2016,
effective Mar. 17, 2016), www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-03/17/content_5054992.htm.
33
See generally Michele Di Maio, Industrial Policies in Developing Countries:
History and Perspectives, in INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF CAPABILITIES ACCUMULATION 108–43 (Mario Cimoli et al. eds., 2009).
34
Key programs at the early stage of development included, for instance, the socalled ‘863’, ‘973’, ‘Spark’ and ‘Torch’ programs. See generally Margaret McCuaigJohnston & Moxi Zhang, China Embarks on Major Change in Science and Technology (U.
of Alta., Occasional Paper Series No. 2, 2015). More recent programs included, for
example, the National Natural Science Fund, the Major Science and Technology Projects,
the National Key R&D Programs, the Technology Innovation Guidance Fund, and the
Bases and Talents Program. These programs are aimed at systematically reshaping the
entire national funding system for science, technology and innovation. See 国务院关于印
发 深 化 中 央 财 政 科 技 计 划 （ 专 项 ， 基 金 等 ） 管 理 改 革 方 案 的 通 知 [Notice on
Deepening the Reform Plan of Central Fiscal Measures on Technology (Funds)]
(promulgated by the State Council, Jan. 7, 2015) www.most.gov.cn/tpxw/201501/t20150
106_117285.htm.
35
See Zenglein & Holzmann, supra note 29, at 9–10.
36
关 于 科 技 创 新 支 撑 复 工 复 产 和 经 济 平 衡 运 行 的 若 干 措 施 [Several
Measures on Supporting the Resumption of Work and Production and the Stability of
Economy with Technology and Innovation] (promulgated by the Ministry of Science and
Technology, Mar. 21, 2020), www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202003/22/content_5494142.htm.
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new infrastructure (hereinafter New Infrastructure Initiative). 37
The New Infrastructure Initiative originated from the Central
Economic Work Conference in December 2018, which endorsed
the importance of “promoting the revolution of manufacturing
skills and the update of essential tech-supportive equipment,
accelerating and expanding the commercialization of 5G, and
strengthening artificial intelligence, industrial internet, and
internet of things.”38 The Initiative will play a significant role in
China’s ambition to become a superpower in science, technology,
and innovation.39
The New Infrastructure Initiative is being implemented
through a new investment and development model underpinned
by diversified investment sources, suggesting a departure from
State-led investment in traditional infrastructure. 40 In the short
term, however, it is likely that central and local governments and
state entities will remain important players in the Initiative.41 This
has become evident in implementation actions adopted at both
national and local levels. For example, some major projects at the
central level involved China Mobile’s RMB 100 billion
investment in 5G,42 State Grid’s RMB 181 billion investment in
ultra-high-voltage power facilities,43 and China Southern Power
Grid’s RMB 25 billion investment in concentrated charging
stations in the southern region of China over the coming four
Premier Keqiang Li, 2020 年政府工作报告, [2020 Government Work Report]
May 22, 2020, www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2020lhzfgzbg/index.htm.
38
‘中央经济工作会议举行习近平李克强作重要讲话’ [President Xi Jinping
and Premier Li Keqiang Give Speech at the Central Economic Working Conference],
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 12, 2019, www.gov.cn/xinwen/201912/12/content_5460670.htm.
39
See generally REBECCA ARCESATI ET AL., MERCATOR INST. FOR CHINA
STUDIES, CHINA’S DIGITAL PLATFORM ECONOMY: ASSESSING DEVELOPMENTS TOWARDS
INDUSTRY 4.0 8 (2020).
40
See 2020 Government Work Report, supra note 37.
41
Zhang Dingfa & Liu Cheng, State-Owned Enterprises Lead the New
Infrastructure and Cultivate New Economic Growth Engines, PEOPLE.CN, (Apr. 24, 2020),
http://ccnews.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0424/c141677-31686310.html.
42
Zhang Lulu, China Eyes “New Infrastructure” to Shore Up Growth,
CHINA.ORG.CN (Mar. 22, 2020), www.china.org.cn/business/202003/22/content_75844807.htm.
43
(央企发力万亿新基建 不走“四万亿”老路) [State-Owned Enterprises Force
Trillions of New Infrastructure, Not to Follow the “Four Trillion” Old Road],
CAIJING.COM.CN (Mar. 21, 2020), http://finance.eastmoney.com/a/202003211426920955.
html (China).
37
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years. 44 Local governments have also swiftly localized the
Initiative and developed implementation strategies. Here
examples include Beijing’s three-year plan focusing on the
construction in six core sectors and 30 key projects;45 Shanghai’s
three-year plan to invest RMB 270 billion in four priority
sectors;46 and Guangdong’s massive construction plan injecting
RMB 5.9 trillion in 1,230 projects prioritizing high-speed railway,
ultra-high voltage grid, 5G, and new energy.47 Notably, private
companies are playing an increasing role. Some of China’s tech
giants, such as Alibaba and Tencent, pledged investments of
billions of RMB in cloud infrastructure, artificial intelligence, and
other technologies.48
On March 11, 2021, China’s National People’s Congress
adopted the Fourteenth Five Year Plan (2021–25) and the 2035

44
(两大电网开启充电桩建设新高潮) [Two Major Power Grids Start a New
Climax in the Construction of Charging Piles], PEOPLE.CN (Apr. 15, 2020),
http://energy.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0415/c71661-31674815.html (China).
45
北京市加快新型基础设施建设行动方案（2020-2022 年） [Beijing Action
Plan for Accelerating the Construction of New Infrastructure (2020-2022)], (promulgated
by Beijing Bureau of Economy and Information Technology, June 2, 2020)
www.beijing.gov.cn/fuwu/lqfw/ztzl/xytxms/zxxx/202006/t20200610_1922075.html
(China). These six core sectors are: (1) new internet infrastructure, (2) data intelligence
infrastructure, (3) ecosystem infrastructure, (4) technological innovation infrastructure, (5)
smart application infrastructure, and (6) trusted and secure infrastructure.
46
(上海市推进新型基础设施建设行动方案 2020-2022 年) [Action Plan for
Accelerating the Construction of New Infrastructure in Shanghai (2020-2022)]
(promulgated
by
Shanghai
People’s
Mun.
Gov’t,
Apr.
29,
2020)
http://stcsm.sh.gov.cn/zwgk/ghjh/20200603/a4c074e101374866a619424aae7a3fbd.html
(China). The four priority sectors in Shanghai’s plan are: (1) new internet, (2) new
infrastructure, (3) new platforms, and (4) new terminals.
47
(广东省发展改革委关于下达广东省 2020 年重点建设项目计划的通知)
[Notice of the Guangdong Provincial Development and Reform Commission on Issuing
the Key Construction Project Plan of Guangdong Province in 2020] (promulgated by
Guangdong Provincial Dev. And Reform Comm., Feb. 28, 2020) http://drc.gd.gov.cn/tjxx
5631/content/mpost_2956713.html (China).
48
Josh Horwitz, Alibaba to Invest $28 Billion in Cloud Services After
Coronavirus Boosted Demand, REUTERS (Apr. 19, 2020), www.reuters.com/article/uschina-alibaba-cloud-investment/alibaba-to-invest-28-billion-in-cloud-services-aftercoronavirus-boosted-demand-idUSKBN22208E; Arjun Kharpal, Tencent Pledges $70
Billion Investment in High-Tech Areas as Beijing Pushes Digital Infrastructure, CNBC
(May 27, 2020), www.cnbc.com/2020/05/27/china-tech-giant-tencent-pledges-70-billioninvestment-in-ai-cloud.html.
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Long-Term Goals. 49 As anticipated, this blueprint emphasizes
technology and innovation as a critical element in the pursuit of
technological independence and global competitiveness, which in
turn serves the overarching goals of modernization and economic
development. 50 While the blueprint maintains the list of the
strategic industries contemplated in MIC 2025 and the Thirteenth
Five Year Plan, it also highlights the vital importance of
foundational research in many frontier areas. Those areas include
new generations of artificial intelligence, quantum computing,
integrated circuits, neuroscience, gene and biotechnology, clinical
medicine and health, aerospace, and deep land and deep-sea
technology. 51 These policies and objectives will lead to more
government support, including the wide spectrum of subsidies
mentioned above and discussed in more detail in Section II.
II. INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS OF SUBSIDIES
Subsidies are one of the most perplexing and
controversial areas of international trade regulation.52 The current
WTO rules on subsidies have undergone nearly eight decades of
development and remain underdeveloped and problematic
according to prevailing views of today. 53 The multilateral
negotiations leading to the subsidy rules’ creation and eventually
the ASCM’s conclusion in the Uruguay Round, have essentially
revolved around a few major competing interests, including on the
one hand, protecting the value of tariff concessions and
See (中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和 2035 年远
景 目 标 纲 要 ) [The Fourteen Five-Year Plan for the National Economic and Social
Development of the People’s Republic of China and the Outline of the Long-Term Goals
for 2035], XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 13, 2021) http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/202103/13/content_5592681.htm (China).
50
Id.
51
Id. § 3.2, ch. 1.
52
See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures 1 (U. Chi. L. Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics
Working Paper No. 186, 2003) https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economic
s/516/.
53
See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 293-303 (2d ed. 1997); Alan O. Sykes, The
Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective, 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 473 (2010); Gary N. Horlick & Peggy A. Clarke, WTO Subsidies Discipline
During and After the Crisis, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 859 (2010); Chad Bown & Jennifer
Hillman, WTO’ing a Resolution to the China Subsidy Problem, 22 J. INT’L ECON. L. 557
(2019).
49
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disciplining trade-distortive subsidies, and on the other hand, the
widespread and persistent need to use subsidies. 54 The
fundamental challenge has been determining how to strike a
balance between the regulation of ‘bad’ subsidies and the
preservation of governments’ rights to use ‘good’ subsidies in
their pursuit of policy objectives.55
This challenge reflects both the standard economics on
trade policies and the political bargain in trade negotiations. Trade
economists have convincingly shown that subsidies are generally
more efficient policy instruments to address domestic externalities
or non-trade policy objectives because they target a problem’s
source more directly, as compared to tariffs and quotas.56 This is
known as the Specificity or Targeting Rule derived from the wellestablished Theory of Distortions and Welfare. 57 Accordingly,
economists have cautioned against excessive discipline on
subsidies that would cause governments to resort to second-best
instruments and have instead reiterated the need for international

54
See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT 367–
69 (1969); 2 PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE
WTO AGREEMENTS ON TRADE IN GOODS 186–91 (2016); Richard R. Rivers & John D.
Greenwald, The Negotiation of a Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures:
Bridging Fundamental Policy Differences, 11 L. & POL’Y. INT’L BUS. 1447 (1979); Gerard
Depayre, Negotiating Subsidies in the GATT/WTO: The Tokyo Round and the Uruguay
Round, in WHAT SHAPES THE LAW? REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY, LAW, POLITICS AND
ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN SUBSIDY DISCIPLINES 51-56 (Luca
Rubini & Jennifer Hawkins eds., 2016). For a more comprehensive and sophisticated
review of Uruguay Round negotiations of subsidy rules, see 2 THE GATT URUGUAY
ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 833–84. (Terrence P. Steward ed., 1993).
55
See Jan Woznowski, The Shape of Things: Few Thoughts on Negotiating Rules
on Subsidies in the GATT and WTO, in WHAT SHAPES THE LAW? REFLECTIONS ON THE
HISTORY, LAW, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN SUBSIDY
DISCIPLINES 45, 45–47 (Luca Rubini & Jennifer Hawkins eds., 2016); Hugo Paemen,
Forces that (May) Have Shaped Subsidy Regulation, in WHAT SHAPES THE LAW?
REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY, LAW, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL AND
EUROPEAN SUBSIDY DISCIPLINES 49, 49–50 (Luca Rubini & Jennifer Hawkins eds., 2016).
56
See, e.g., RICHARD BLACKHURST, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT
TYPES OF TRADE MEASURES AND THEIR IMPACT ON CONSUMERS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND THE CONSUMER 94–111 (1986); see Peter H Lindert, The Basic Analysis of a Tariff,
in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 121, 121 (8th ed., 1986).
57
See generally JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, The Generalized Theory of Distortions
and Welfare, in TRADE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND GROWTH: PAPERS IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER 69–90 (Jagdish N.
Bhagwati et al., eds., 1971); see generally JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, FREE TRADE TODAY
(2002) (reviewing the historical development of the theory and its applications).
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rules to distinguish between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ subsidies. 58
Generally speaking, ‘bad’ subsidies would inflict welfare losses
on trading partners and the world economy as a whole, whereas
‘good’ subsidies genuinely serve non-protectionist, tradeunrelated regulatory goals, regardless of their side-effects on
trade.59
Although trade negotiators are usually knowledgeable
about the above economic principles, they are constrained by
internal politics and tend to succumb to the pressures of influential
constituents.60 Consequently, the WTO subsidy rules are not so
much concerned about the welfare effects of subsidies as about
the impact on competing producer interests. 61 The political
compromise embodied in the ASCM largely came out of the
insistence of the United States on stricter subsidy rules on the one
hand, and the resistance of the EU and others (mainly developing
countries) to over-regulation and encroachment on policy space
on the other hand.62 The ASCM reached a middle ground by, inter
alia, limiting the scope of subsidies and addressing the
extraterritorial effects of the covered subsidies.63 Only two types
– export subsidies and local content subsidies – are prohibited.64
Domestic subsidies are generally ‘actionable’ only (as opposed to
‘prohibited’), meaning that Members may take actions to address
the adverse effects of these subsidies. 65 The other important
element of this compromise was a category of ‘non-actionable’
subsidies—including certain subsidies for R&D, environmental
58
See, e.g., Sykes, supra note 53; Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Will
International Rules on Subsidies Disrupt the World Trading System?, 96 AMER. ECON.
REV. 877 (2006); LUCA RUBINI, E15 INITIATIVE, RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL SUBSIDIES
DISCIPLINES: RATIONALE AND POSSIBLE AVENUES FOR REFORM (2015); KEITH MASKUS,
E15 INTIATIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES: A NEED FOR WTO DISCIPLINES?
(2015).
59
However, whether a subsidy produces net welfare gains is often ambiguous and
difficult to assess as governments tend to subsidize for political reasons without regard to
the welfare effects of the subsidy. JACKSON, supra note 53, at 281–82.
60
This observation essentially stems from Public Choice theory. See generally
Weihuan Zhou, In Defence of the WTO: Why Do We Need a Multilateral Trading System?
47 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 1, 9 (2020).
61
See, e.g., MAVROIDIS, supra note 54, at 193–94; Sykes, supra note 53, at 501–
19.
62
See Stewart, supra note 54, at 833–84.
63
See ASCM, supra note 17, arts. 1–6.
64
Id.
65
Id.
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protection, and regional development—which were permitted and
exempted from countervailing actions on a provisional basis for
five years.66 However, this category expired as WTO Members
failed to reach a consensus to renew it by December 31, 1999.67
R&D subsidies warrant more observation given their
relevance to this article. The Uruguay Round negotiations started
with a disagreement between proponents of making R&D
subsidies non-actionable (e.g., the EU, Canada, Switzerland,
Japan and Nordic Countries) and the United States, which
opposed the idea of non-actionability in general and regarded
R&D subsidies as being particularly susceptible to abuse.68 The
US changed its position at a later stage of the negotiations due to
a domestic policy shift to promoting subsidization of R&D
activities under the Clinton Administration since 1993.69 However,
this shift did not fundamentally change the overall position of the
US, which continued to push for stricter discipline on tradedistortive subsidies including confining the scope and magnitude
of R&D subsidies and retaining the flexibility to apply
countervailing measures to those beyond the agreed limits.70 The
final compromise was the incorporation of a carefully-crafted list
of conditions on R&D subsidies, the provisional application of
non-actionability, and other requirements such as notification.71
The inclusion of R&D subsidies in the non-actionable category
aligns with economic guidance that subsidies tend to be the
optimal means to correct market failures in R&D activities by
bringing such activities to the socially optimal level, which in turn
generates positive spillovers economy-wide. However, the nonactionability conditions were designed to meet the needs of
developed economies, particularly the United States, and did not
accommodate the interests of developing economies. 72 This
explains why developing countries opposed the extension of the
66

Id. arts. 8, 31.
WTO, Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Minutes of the
Special Meeting Held on 20 December 1999, G/SCM/M/22 (Feb. 17, 2000).
68
See Stewart, supra note 54, at 904–14.
85
See George Kleinfeld & David Kaye, Red Light, Green Light? The 1994
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Research and Development
Assistance, and U.S. Policy, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 43, 51–52 (1994).
70
Id. at 52–54.
71
See ASCM, supra note 17, art. 8.
72
See Kleinfeld & Kaye, supra note 69, at 51–52.
67
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non-actionable category unless the conditions could be modified
to provide room for them to pursue developmental goals.73 The
call for improvement of the applicability of non-actionable
subsidies, including R&D subsidies, for economic development
has continued in the Doha Round negotiations.74 The expiry of
non-actionable subsidies means that there currently is no
distinction between “good” and “bad” subsidies based on policy
objectives underlying the grant of a subsidy under the ASCM.75
As noted earlier, there have been growing concerns about
the effectiveness of WTO subsidy rules in dealing with Chinese
subsidies effectuated by ambitious industrial policies. One of the
latest criticisms come from Bown and Hillman, who identified
many shortcomings in the ASCM to address Chinese subsidies,
including the definition of subsidies, the difficulties of satisfying
the relevant evidentiary burden, and lack of notification and
retrospective remedies.76 But Bown and Hillman’s analysis has
two major shortcomings. First, they did not provide a detailed
discussion of specific types of Chinese subsidies and the potential
issues in applying the existing rules to these subsidies in light of
the case law. Second, they did not distinguish between
deficiencies specific to China and those generally applicable to all
WTO Members. In discussing the existing rules applicability to
China’s subsidies in the high-tech sector below, we argue that
these rules have provided sufficient flexibility to address these
subsidies. Most of the potential challenges in the application of
these rules are not China-specific, but applicable to all WTO
Members. Therefore, linking these challenges exclusively to
China’s subsidies or characterizing them as “China-specific
problems” is highly questionable and would not help resolve these
problems in future negotiations.
73
WTO, Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Minutes of the
Regular Meeting Held on 1-2 November 1999, WTO Doc. G/SCM/M/24 (Apr. 26, 2000).
For a more detailed discussion of the various views, see Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, Resurrecting the
Dead? The Expired Non-Actionable Subsidies and the Lingering Question of ‘Green
Space’, 8 MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 2, 8–9 (2011).
74
For a review of the proposals for reforming subsidy rules by WTO Members,
see Siqi Li & Xinquan Tu, Reforming WTO Subsidy Rules: Past Experiences and Prospects,
54 J. WORLD TRADE 853, 854–867 (2020).
75
See also WOLFGANG MULLER, WTO AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES: A COMMENTARY 7–8 (2017).
76
See Bown & Hillman, supra note 53, at 567–72.
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As noted in Section I, China’s pursuit of technological
advancement involved wide-ranging supportive policy
instruments including different forms of subsidies. It is both
unrealistic and unnecessary to cover all these instruments and
subsidies in this article. Instead, we will consider typical and
major examples to facilitate a discussion of the efficacy of the
existing WTO rules which include not only the general rules
contemplated in the ASCM but also the China-specific rules
codified in the Protocol on the Accession of China77 (hereinafter
Accession Protocol) and the Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of China78 (hereinafter Working Party Report).
A. Definition of Subsidies
The ASCM does not cover all government actions or
measures that may have the effect of distorting trade but only a
closed list of subsidies.79 For a measure to be a covered subsidy,
it must constitute a “financial contribution” (or “any form of
income or price support”) that is provided by a government, a
“public body,” or a “private body entrusted or directed,” to
exercise relevant government functions, and confers a “benefit” to
the recipient concerned.80 Bown and Hillman did not take issue
with all these legal elements but focused on the limited scope of
covered subsidies and the law on the meaning of “public body.”81
For completeness, we will consider each of these elements below.
1. Financial contributions — direct transfer of
funds. — Article 1.1(a)(1) of the ASCM encompasses three types
of “financial contributions”: (1) direct transfer of funds; (2)
foregoing or non-collection of government revenue otherwise due;
and (3) provision of goods or services (other than general
infrastructure) or purchase of goods. Although the coverage of
“financial contributions” was intended to be exhaustive and

77
WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WTO Doc.
WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Accession Protocol].
78
WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China (‘Working Party
Report’), WTO Doc. WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001).
79
See ASCM, supra note 17, art. 1.
80
Id.
81
See Bown & Hillman, supra note 53, at 567–72.
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arguably to avoid “a purely effect-based concept of subsidies,”82
it has been interpreted and applied in a flexible and broad manner.
Indeed, in one of the earlier disputes under the ASCM, the
Appellate Body observed that “financial contribution” covers “a
wide range of transactions” “through which something of
economic value is transferred by a government.” 83 This broad
interpretation can apply to Chinese subsidies in the high-tech
sector.
“Direct transfer of funds” covers not only measures such
as grants, loans, and equity infusion, but also “potential direct
transfers of funds or liabilities,” such as loan guarantees.84 These
measures and their variations have been found to constitute a
“financial contribution” in a range of cases. Identified measures
include, inter alia, grant payments, 85 non-commercial loans, 86
debt-for-equity swaps and debt rescheduling by way of
interest/debt reductions, deferrals, and forgiveness, 87 equity
infusion,88 transfers of equity interests or shares,89 and any other
forms leading to “an accrual of financial resources” and other

82
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large
Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WTO Doc. WT/DS353/AB/R (adopted Mar. 23, 2012),
¶ 613 [hereinafter US — Aircraft (2nd complaint)] (holding that “[s]ubparagraphs (i)-(iv)
exhaust the types of government conduct deemed to constitute a financial contribution”).
See also Muller, supra note 75, at 62, 74; MAVROIDIS, supra note 54, at 202–03, 215–16.
83
Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty
Determination with respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WTO Doc.
WT/DS257/AB/R (adopted Feb. 17, 2004), ¶ 52 [hereinafter US — Softwood Lumber IV].
84
See ASCM, supra note 17, art. 1.1(a)(1)(i).
85
Panel Report, Australia — Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of
Automotive Leather, WTO Doc. WT/DS126/R (adopted June 16, 1999), ¶¶ 2.1–2.5, 9.43–
9.45.
86
Id.
87
Panel Report, Korea — Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels,
WT/DS273/R (adopted Apr. 11, 2005), ¶¶ 7.336–7.339, 7.411–7.413. In the panel’s view,
while “interest reductions and deferrals are similar to new loans” and “interest/debt
forgiveness is comparable to a cash grant”, debt-for-equity swaps are “a combination of
equity infusion and debt forgiveness”. See also US — Aircraft (2nd complaint), supra note
82, ¶ 615.
88
See US — Aircraft (2nd complaint), supra note 82, ¶¶ 622–24 (involving joint
venture arrangements whereby funds were provided by U.S. National Aeronautics & Space
Administration and U.S. Department of Defense in exchange for some kind of return, such
as scientific and technical information (from Boeing).
89
Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WTO Doc. WT/DS316/R (adopted June 1, 2011),
¶ 7.1291 [hereinafter EC — Aircraft].
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financial claims that improve the financial position of the
recipient.90
The sub-category of “potential direct transfers of funds or
liabilities” typically involves “a legally binding promise” or “an
obligation to make a direct transfer of funds which, in and of itself,
is claimed and capable of conferring a benefit on the recipient that
is separate and independent from the benefit that might be
conferred from any future transfer of funds.”91 However, it does
not cover measures that merely create the possibility of transfer of
funds when pre-defined conditions have been fulfilled. 92 This
suggests that this type of government actions must involve an
undertaking to transfer funds upon the fulfillment of pre-defined
conditions.
Finally, it is worth noting that the term “direct” does not
require a transfer of funds to be made by a government directly
but merely that a government, through its practice, has been
involved in such a transfer, according to the Appellate Body in US
– Carbon Steel (India). 93 There, the Appellate Body rejected
India’s claim that the provision of a loan through an affiliated
entity to a public body was not a “direct” transfer of funds merely
due to the involvement of an intermediary or intervening agency.94
It also clarified that the funds transferred do not have to be “drawn
from government resources or result in a charge on the public
account.”95
Contrary to widespread concerns about the potential
difficulties in identifying Chinese subsidies on the basis that they
may be provided in a sophisticated and opaque manner,96 some of
90
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random
Access Memories from Korea, WTO Doc. WT/DS336/AB/R (adopted Dec. 17, 2007),
¶¶ 247, 250–52 [hereinafter Japan — DRAMs (Korea)].
91
See EC — Aircraft, supra note 89, ¶¶ 7.302, 7.304, 7.733, 7.1495 (emphasis in
original).
92
Panel Report, United States — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft
(Second Complaint), WTO Doc. WT/DS353/R (adopted Mar. 23, 2012), ¶¶ 7.164–7.166.
93
Appellate Body Report, United States — Countervailing Measures on Certain
Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India, WTO Doc. WT/DS436/AB/R (adopted
Dec. 19, 2014), ¶ 4.90 [hereinafter US — Carbon Steel (India)].
94
Id. ¶¶ 4.93–4.94.
95
Id. ¶ 4.96.
96
See Bown & Hillman, supra note 53, at 563–70. Also see supra note 15; Mark
Wu, ‘The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance’, (2016)57(2) HARV. INT’L
L.J. 261, 269–84.
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the major subsidies in the technology sector fall squarely within
the category of direct transfer of funds. For example, to boost the
growth of the NEVs industry, both central and local governments
have provided a range of financial support,97 mainly in the form
of direct payments to NEV manufacturers (including R&D grants
in the sector)98 and consumers,99 and loans from State banks.100
Between 2009 and 2017, the total support in the industry was
estimated to be RMB 390 billion ($58.3 billion). 101 While the
forms and amounts of these subsidies have been reviewed and
adjusted regularly in response to changing needs, the sector’s
overall support is likely to grow.102
97
Marika Heller, Chinese Government Support for New Energy Vehicles as a
Trade Battleground, NAT’L BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH (Sept. 27, 2017),
www.nbr.org/publication/chinese-government-support-for-new-energy-vehicles-as-atrade-battleground/.
98
See, e.g.,《关于 2018 年度，2016 年及以前年度新能源汽车推广应用补助
资 金清 算审 核 和 2018 年度 ，2019 年度 补助 资金预 拨审 核情 况的 公示 》 [The
Publication of the Liquidation Review of New Energy Vehicles Promotion and Application
Subsidies in 2018, 2016 and Previous Years and the Review of Additional Subsidies
allocated
for
2018
and
2019],
issued
on
Mar.
25,
2020,
http://www.caam.org.cn/chn/9/cate_97/con_5230443.html;《上海市鼓励购买和使用新
能源汽车实施办法》[The Implementing Measures on Encouraging the Purchase and Use
of New Energy Vehicles in Shanghai] (issued by the Off. of the Shanghai Gov’t, Jan. 31,
2018), www.shanghai.gov.cn/nw43336/20200824/0001-43336_55412.html (China).
99
See, e.g.,《关于开展私人购买新能源汽车补贴试点的通知》[The Notice on
Launching Pilot Subsidies for Private Purchases of New Energy Vehicles], (issued by the
Ministry of Finance of China, May 31, 2010), www.mof.gov.cn/gp/xxgkml/jjjss/201006/t
20100602_2499641.html (China). For instance, subsidies for plug-in hybrid vehicles and
pure electric vehicles can be RMB 50,000 and RMB 60,000 per car.
100
China’s first Automotive Workshop recently obtained a huge credit line worth
RMB 1015 billion from 16 banks in China, including state banks. See, China’s First
Automotive Workshop Collaborates Strategically with 16 Banks to Obtain Credit Line
Exceeding RMB 1 Trillion, XINHUANET (Oct. 25, 2018), www.xinhuanet.com/auto/201810/25/c_1123610511.htm. Another example is Tesla, which secured approximately RMB
20 billion loans from Chinese banks for its Shanghai Gigafactory. See Tongxin Qian, Tesla
Shanghai Obtained Another RMB 4 Billion Loans from Chinese Banks, Totaling RMB 20
Billion Loans, YICAI (May 9, 2020), www.yicai.com/news/100622862.html.
101
See Scott Kennedy, China’s Expensive Gamble on New-Energy Vehicles, CTR
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Nov. 6, 2018), www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-expensivegamble-new-energy-vehicles.
102
《关于完善新能源汽车推广应用财政补贴政策的通知》[Notice on Fiscal
Policies for the Popularization and the Application of New Energy Vehicles] (issued by
the Ministry of Finance of China, Apr. 23, 2020), www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202004/23/content_5505502.htm (China). Notably, the detrimental impacts of US – China trade
war on China’s NEV industry, together with the outbreak of COVID-19, have propelled
Chinese central government to extend some of the existing NEV subsidies, which
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Another longstanding example is the massive industrial
investment funds that the Chinese government directed competent
national authorities and local governments to establish for eligible
enterprises in priority sectors since the 1980s.103 Over time, these
funds have targeted start-ups or technology-oriented small and
medium sized entities to promote indigenous innovation, 104 as
well as the creation of national champions.105 By the end of 2013,
343 such funds with a total value of around RMB 270 billion had
been created.106 The scale and amount of the funds continued to
otherwise would lapse in the end of 2020 to the end of 2022. See Jianhua Zhao, Why does
China Extend New Energy Vehicle Subsidies?, PEOPLE.CN (Apr. 26, 2020),
http://auto.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0426/c1005-31688105.html.
103
The New Technology Venture Capital Company established in 1986 was
China’s first venture capital company that provided investments and loans for high-tech
sector. The major shareholders were: State Scientific and Technological Commission and
Ministry of Finance. The company operated for 13 years. See, Ministry of Science and
Technology: To Accelerate the Development of Venture Capital with Chinese
Characteristics and Build New Engine for Innovation-led Growth, CCTV.COM (Sept. 23,
2016), http://jingji.cctv.com/2016/09/23/ARTIZR6niGUZ2ajwhbFwoVCH160923.shtml.
104
See, e.g.,《科技型中小企业创业投资引导基金管理暂行办法》[Interim
Measures on the Administration of Start-up and Investment Guiding Fund for Technologyoriented Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises] (issued by the Ministry of Finance and the
Ministry of Science and Technology, July 6, 2007), www.most.gov.cn/ztzl/gjzctx/ptzcjrz
c/200802/t20080225_59300.htm (China);《战略性新兴产业发展专项资金管理暂行办
法》 [Interim Measures on the Administration of Special Funds for the Development of
Strategic Emerging Industries] (issued by the Ministry of Finance and the Nattional
Development and Reform Commission, Dec. 31, 2012), www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/20
13/content_2376208.htm (China); 《新兴产业创投计划参股创业投资基金管理暂行办
法》[Interim Measures on the Administration of the Equity Participation of Emerging
Industries Start-up and Investment Plan in the Start-up and Investment Fund] (issued by
the Ministry of Finance and the National Development and Reform Commission, Aug. 17,
2011), www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-09/09/content_1944275.htm (China). The prioritized
areas included: energy conservation and environmental protection, information, bio and
new medicine, new energy, new materials, aerospace and aviation, marine, advanced
manufacturing, new energy vehicles, and high- technology service. In 2015, the State
Council announced the plan to create RMB 40 billion National Guiding Fund for Start-up
Investment in Emerging Industries. See Press Release, Jun Ding et al., The Establishment
of National Guiding Fund for Start-up Investment in Emerging Industries with RMB 40
Billion which can be Multiplied by 5 Times (Jan. 15, 2015) (www.gov.cn/zhengce/201501/15/content_2804446.htm).
105
See Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], Measuring distortions in
international markets: The semiconductor value chain, at 51–52, OECD Trade Policy
Papers No. 234 (Dec. 12, 2019), www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/measuring-distortions-ininternational-markets_8fe4491d-en [hereinafter OECD Semiconductor Report].
106
Bank of China Research Institute provided a detailed review of China’s
Government Guiding Funds, see BANK OF CHINA RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE
DEVELOPMENT, PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS OF CHINA’S GOVERNMENT GUIDING FUNDS
(Sept. 26, 2017).
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grow explosively since 2014, especially after the launch of MIC
2025. Major examples include the National Integrated Circuit
Investment Fund (2014) (IC Fund), 107 the Advanced
Manufacturing Industry Investment Fund (2016), 108 and more
recently the National Manufacturing Industry Transformation and
Upgrading Fund (2019).109 All of these funds were created under
the leadership of the relevant central authorities, particularly the
Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology (MIIT), supported by State banks and
followed by the creation of similar funds by local governments.110
The funds were provided to select enterprises in the relevant
sectors mainly by way of equity injection, loans, and loan
guarantees.111 The IC Fund, for example, was initially supported
by a State-directed loan of RMB 30 billion from the China
Development Bank in addition to equity infusion from the MOF

107
See Press Release, Ministry of Indus. and Info. Technology, The Establishment
of the National Integrated Circuit Investment Fund (Oct. 14, 2014), www.miit.gov.cn/n11
46290/n1146402/n7039597/c7053700/content.html.
108
See Press Release, State-owned Assets Supervision and Admin. Comm’n of the
State Council, The Establishment of the Advanced Manufacturing Industry Investment
Fund (June 12, 2016), www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588025/n2588124/c3822803/content.html.
109
See Ministry of Finance, China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation and others
Initiated the Establishment of the National Manufacturing Industry Transformation and
Upgrading Fund Limited Liability Company with Registered Capital Worth RMB 147.2
Billion, YICAI (Nov. 18, 2019), www.yicai.com/news/100407324.html.
110
See 《 创 业 投 资 企 业 管 理 暂 行 办 法 》 [Interim Measures on the
Administration of Start-up Investment Enterprises] (issued jointly by ten State ministries
and departments, Nov. 15, 2005, effective Mar. 1, 2006), www.gov.cn/flfg/200511/15/content_99008.htm (China); See also Min Ren, The Initiation of Beijing Municipal
Technology Innovation Fund Worth Dozens Billions to Support High-end Hard
Technologies, BEIJING DAILY (June 25, 2018), www.gov.cn/xinwen/201806/25/content_5300997.htm; Guangzhou Municipal Government established RMB 5
billion government guiding fund on the industrialization of scientific and technological
achievements in 2020. See 《关于印发广州市科技成果产业化引导基金管理办法的通
知 》 [Measures for Administration of the Guiding Fund on the Industrialization of
Scientific and Technological Achievements] (issued by Guangzhou Sci, and Technology
Bureau, June 19, 2020), http://kjj.gz.gov.cn/gkmlpt/content/5/5955/post_5955622.html#2
75 (China).
111
See Interim Measures on the Administration of Start-up Investment Enterprises,
supra note 110. Article 22 stipulates that national and sub-national governments can
establish investment funds by means of equity participation and other forms of financing
guarantees. 《 关 于 印 发 广 州 市 科 技 型 中 小 企 业 贷 款 担 保 资 金 管 理 办 法 的 通
知》 [Measures for Administration of Loan Guarantee Funds for Small and Medium-sized
Technology Enterprises] (issued by the Guangzhou Department of Finance, Jan. 21, 2020),
http://czj.gz.gov.cn/gkmlpt/content/5/5637/post_5637742.html#601 (China).
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and other government entities.112 Between 2014 and 2018, the first
tranche of the fund invested over RMB 100 billion in 74 projects
and 52 IC companies, with nearly 80 percent of the investment
coming from equity injection,113 and contributed significantly to
creating a handful of the world’s leading IC firms.114 The fund
recently completed its second tranche capital raising of over RMB
200 billion, which will focus on investing in home-grown chips
for advanced materials and equipment, and emerging technology
infrastructure like 5G.115 Given the broad scope of “direct transfer
of funds,” there is little doubt that these funds constitute “financial
contributions” under Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) of the ASCM.
Notably, some of the subsidies in the form of “direct
transfer of funds” may constitute export subsidies, one of the two
types of prohibited subsidies.116 China’s use of export credits to
promote exports of high-tech goods offers a good illustration. In
practice, such measures have been employed by most major
economies—through financial support like loans—to assist
domestic exporters selling goods and services to foreign buyers.117
In China, export credit policies have become a major form of
support for high-tech firms and exports since the early 2000s,
including loan support for the export of high-tech products

112
See Press Release, China Dev. Bank Capital, The Establishment of the National
Integrated Circuit Investment Fund and Its Management Company (www.cdbcapital.com/GKJR/dynamic/17081111400611?pidx=1); For the shareholding of the Fund,
see, Li Na, The Second Tranche of the National Big Fund was Established and Where RMB
200 Billion will Go, YICAI (Oct. 28, 2019), www.yicai.com/news/100380063.html.
113
The Analysis of China’s National Integrated Circuit Investment Fund First
Tranche’s Investment, SINA FINANCE (Mar. 13, 2019, 1:25 PM), https://finance.sina.com.
cn/stock/hyyj/2019-03-13/doc-ihsxncvh2157328.shtml.
114
See OECD Semiconductor Report, supra note 105, at 51–54.
115
Focus on the Outline of the Second Tranche of the Big Fund and Possible
Priority Areas for Investment, YICAI (Mar. 19, 2020, 8:40 PM), www.yicai.com/news/1
00556598.html; Sarah Dai, China completes second round of US$29 billion Big Fund
aimed at investing in domestic chip industry, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (July 26, 2019,
12:46 PM), www.scmp.com/tech/science-research/article/3020172/china-said-completesecond-round-us29-billion-fund-will.
116
See ASCM, supra note 17, art. 3.
117
See Kristen Hopewell, Power transitions and global trade governance: The
impact of a rising China on the export credit regime, 13 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 1, 4–5
(2019); James Nedumpara & Pankhuri Sharma, Treatment of Export Credits in WTO
Dispute Settlement and Domestic CVD Proceedings, 1, 7–9 (Ctr. for WTO Stud., Working
Paper No. CWS/WP/200/7, Mar. 2013), http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/workingpaper/Export%
20Credit%20CWS%20WP.pdfhttp://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/workingpaper/Export%20Credit
%20CWS%20WP.pdf.
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contemplated in the Catalogue of High and New Tech Products
and the Catalogue of Chinese New and High-Tech Export
Products,118 and preferential loans, buyer credit, or export credit
insurance, for specific products or projects such as
telecommunications, 119 and NEVs. 120 Such measures are
widespread at both central and local levels,121 making China one
of the world’s largest providers of export credits. 122 These
measures obviously constitute a “financial contribution” and fall
within the ambit of items (j) and (k) of ASCM’s illustrative list of
export subsidies, although the extent to which the ASCM leaves

118
《 中 国 进 出 口 银 行 出 口 卖 方 信 贷 中 短 期 额 度 贷 款 管 理 办 法 》 [The
Administration Measures of the Exim Bank of China on Export Sellers’ Credit and Short
to Medium Term Line of Loan] (issued by Exim Bank of China, Feb. 4, 2002),
http://pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=alftwotitle&Gid=cb00095e263c71c1bdfb
(China). 《中国高新技术产品指导目录》 [The Guiding Catalogue of China’s New and
High- Tech Products] (issued by the Ministry of Science and Technology, Sept. 27 2009),
www.most.gov.cn/tztg/200910/t20091009_73551.htm (China); 《中国高新技术产品出
口目录》 [The Catalogue of China’s New and High-Tech Export Products] (issued by the
Ministry of Science and Technology, Jan. 9, 2006),
http://most.cn/fggw/zfwj/zfwj2006/200512/t20051220_55439.htm (China).
119
《大型成套电信设备出口项目协调管理实施细则》 [Detailed Rules on the
Implementation of Coordination and Management of Large-Scale Complete Set
Telecommunication Export Items] (issued by the Ministry of Com., June 5, 2006),
http://file.mofcom.gov.cn/article/gkml/200804/20080499611491.shtml
(China);
As
alleged by Fred Hochberg, the ex-Chairman and President of the Export-Import Bank of
the US, Huawei received USD 30 billion credit line from China Development Bank that
allowed the company to “reduce its cost of capital and to offer financing to their buyers at
rates and terms better than their competitors.” See Fred Hochberg, Chairman and President
of the Exp.-Imp. Bank of the U.S., Remarks at the Center for American Progress: How the
US Can Lead the World in Exports: Retooling Our Export Finance Strategy for the 21st
Century, (June 15, 2011) (transcript available at www.exim.gov/sites/default/files/newsre
leases/CAP_Speech.pdf).
120
《国务院关于印发节能与新能源汽车产业发展规划（2012-2020）的通知》
[Notice on Plan for Energy Conservation and New Energy Vehicles Industry Development]
(issued by the State Council, June 28, 2012), www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2012/content
_2182749.htm (China).
121
For a recent example of local export credit policy, see Shanghai Federation of
Industry and Commerce Signed Strategic Cooperation with Shanghai Exim Bank and
Shanghai Sinosure, CHINA BUSINESS TIMES (Apr. 26, 2021), http://www.acfic.org.cn/gd
gsl_362/sh/shfgdt/202104/t20210426_256972.html.
122
Hopewell, supra note 117, at 7–8; EXP.-IMP. BANK OF THE U.S., REPORT TO
THE U.S. CONGRESS ON GLOBAL EXPORT CREDIT COMPETITION 38 (2020),
https://www.exim.gov/sites/default/files/reports/competitiveness_reports/2019/EXIM_20
19_CompetitivenessReport_FINAL.pdf.
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space for using export credit remains controversial.123 However,
to the extent that such policy space may cause insufficiencies in
the current subsidy rules in dealing with trade-distortive export
credit policies, the insufficiencies apply to all WTO Members.
2. Financial contributions — foregoing or non-collection
of government revenue otherwise due — A financial contribution
may be granted if a government foregoes or does not collect
“revenue that is otherwise due.”124 To date, the WTO case law has
predominantly concentrated on tax revenues. A major case on this
issue is US – FSC which concerned the exemption of a foreign
sales corporation’s (FSC) export-related foreign-source income
from US income tax. 125 The Appellate Body observed that a
determination of “otherwise due” requires a comparison between
“the revenues due under the contested measure and revenues that
would be due in some other situation” based on “the rules of
taxation of each Member”. 126 The Appellate Body upheld the
panel’s finding that the US government had not collected the
revenue that it was entitled to collect under its own general rules
of taxation.127 In the compliance proceedings of this dispute, the
Appellate Body further clarified that the fact that “a government
does not raise revenue which it could have raised” is not, in itself,

123
For instance, one major controversy concerns the exemption of export credits
permitted under “an international undertaking on official export credits” from being treated
as an export subsidy under item (k). In practice, this exemption points to the OECD
Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits. However, it remains debatable as to
whether WTO Members may still take countervailing actions against such export credits;
See generally Dominic Coppens, How Much Credit for Export Credit Support under the
SCM Agreement?, 12 INT’L ECON. L.J. 63, 63 (2009); Nedumpara and Sharma, supra note
117; A related, ongoing debate has been whether China’s export credits comply with the
conditions contemplated in the OECD Arrangement. This would require a separate and
detailed study on the specific Chinese measures, which seems lacking in the existing
literature and falls outside of the scope of this article; See e.g., EXP.-IMP. BANK OF THE
U.S., supra note 122, at 40–44 (the report identified major Chinese export credit measures
during 2019 without assessing their compliance with the OECD Arrangement); Gregory
Shaffer et al., Can Informal Law Discipline Subsidies?, 18 J. INT’L ECON. LAW 711, 725729 (2015) (observing that the OECD Arrangement has served as multilateral discipline of
export credit policies and may be effective in constraining the practices of all countries
including China).
124
See ASCM, supra note 17, art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii).
125
See generally Appellate Body Report, United States — Tax Treatment for
‘Foreign Sales Corporations’, WT/DS108/AB/R (adopted Mar. 20, 2000) [hereinafter
US — FSC].
126
Id. ¶ 90.
127
US —FSC, supra note 125, at ¶¶ 7, 95.
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conclusive as to whether the revenue foregone is “otherwise
due.” 128 The appropriate benchmark for comparison must be
identified and examined based on “the fiscal treatment of the
relevant income for taxpayers in comparable situations.” 129
Accordingly, the Appellate Body found that while foreign-source
income of US citizens and residents was generally taxable, the
contested measure exempted certain foreign-source income from
tax amounting to foregoing revenue otherwise due.130 This legal
test was refined in US – Aircraft (2nd complaint) where the
Appellate Body explained that the comparison should involve “the
tax treatment that applies to the alleged subsidy recipients and the
tax treatment of comparable income of comparably situated
taxpayers” in the jurisdiction concerned.131 The Appellate Body
upheld the panel’s affirmative finding of foregoing of revenue
otherwise due on the ground that the Washington State Business
and Occupation Tax regime applied a lower tax rate to commercial
aircraft and component manufacturers compared to the rates
applicable to general manufacturing, wholesaling, and retailing
activities in the state.132 Finally, if a government does not collect
the tax revenue in full at the time that it normally would under the
comparable benchmark, that would also amount to foregoing of
revenue otherwise due as the government effectively gives up the
entitlement to “enjoy the cash available to it and earn interest on
it.”133
Preferential tax treatment is a well-known source of
government support in China’s high-tech sector.134 For example,
China’s new Corporate Income Tax Law 2008 provides for a
reduced tax rate of 15 percent (as opposed to the standard rate of
25percent) for High-New Technology Enterprises (HNTEs), and
128
Appellate Body Report, United States–Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales
Corporations’ – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, ¶ 88,
WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/RW (adopted Jan. 29, 2002).
129
Id. ¶¶ 90–92.
130
Id. ¶¶ 98–105.
131
See US — Aircraft (2nd complaint), supra note 82, ¶¶ 812–13.
132
Id. ¶¶ 816–31.
133
Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Certain Measures Concerning Taxation and
Charges, ¶ 5.220, WTO Doc. WT/DS472/AB/R, WT/DS497/AB/R (adopted
Jan. 11, 2019).
134
See generally TERENCE P. STEWART, U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REV.
COMM’N, CHINA’S INDUSTRIAL SUBSIDIES STUDY: HIGH TECHNOLOGY (2007),
https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-industrial-subsidies-study-high-technology.
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permissible reductions of costs and expenses for the R&D of new
technology, products, and design more generally.135 To qualify as
an HNTE, an entity must undertake R&D in one of the priority
high-tech sectors 136 and satisfy a list of conditions including
ownership of the proprietary IP rights of the core technology used
in its production of goods or services.137 The law also directs local
governments to provide other forms of tax preferences for newlyestablished HNTEs in designated regions. 138 The Shanghai
Pudong New Zone, for instance, provides for a tax exemption for
the first two years of operation of HNTEs and a reduced tax rate
of 12.5 percent for the following three years. 139 More recently,
similar tax incentives were extended to the services sector to
stimulate investment in so-called Advanced Technology Services

135

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa (中华人民共和国企业所
得税法) [Corporate Income Tax Law on People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008), art. 28 (China).
136
These sectors are consistent with the national policy plans discussed in Section
II and may continue to change accordingly. The most updated criteria can be found in
Gaoxin Jishu Qiye Rending Guanli Banfa （ 高新 技术 企业 认定 管理 办 法） [The
Measures on the Administration of the Qualification of High-New Technology Enterprises],
(issued by the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Finance and the State
Taxation Administration on Jan. 29, 2016), www.most.gov.cn/tztg/201602/t20160204_12
3994.htm. Gaoxin Jishu Qiye Rending Guanli Gongzuo Zhiyin (高新技术企业认定管理
工 作 指 引 ) [The Guidance on the Administration of the Qualification of High-New
Technology Enterprises], (issued by the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry
of Finance and the State Taxation Administration June 22, 2016),
www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810755/c2200380/content.html.
137
Guanyu Shishi GaoxinKeji Qiye Suodeshui Youhui Zhengce Youguan Wentide
Gonggao (关于实施高薪科技企业所得税优惠政策有关问题的公告) 【The Notice on
Several Questions Relating to the Implementation of Corporate Income Tax Incentives
Policies for High-New Technology Enterprises] (issued by the State Taxation
Administration June 19, 2017), www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810755/c2684881/conte
nt.html.
138
Corporate Income Tax Law on People’s Republic of China, supra note 135,
art. 57. For clarifications made by the State Taxation Administration on the application of
this provision, visit www.chinatax.gov.cn/chinatax/n810341/n810765/n812176/n812748/
c1193020/content.html. The designated regions include four Special Economic Zones in
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen and Hainan, and the Shanghai Pudong New Zone.
139
Guowuyuan Guanyu Jingji Tequ He Shanghai Pudong Xinqu Xin Sheli Gaoxin
Jishu Qiye Shixing Guodu Xing Shuishou Youhui De Tongzhi (国务院关于经济特区和
上海浦东新区新设立高薪技术企业实行过度行税收优惠的通知) [Notice on the
Application of Transitional Tax Incentives for Newly-Established High-New Technology
Enterprises in Special Economic Zones and Shanghai Pudong New Zone] (issued by the
State Council Feb. 26, 2007), www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2008/content_871687.htm.
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Enterprises (ATSEs). 140 Qualified services include, inter alia,
software development and technical support, IC design and test
platform, information system and maintenance, business
operation, and data-related services.141 Like HNTEs, ATSEs are
eligible for a reduced tax rate of 15 percent and reductions of
expenses associated with the education and training of
employees. 142 Applying the WTO case law above, these tax
incentives may be easily found to constitute “foregoing of
government revenue otherwise due.” The benchmark for
comparison would be the Chinese tax rules (e.g., corporate income
tax rate and deductions) applicable to other entities in the same or
comparable industries. Such industries may include those which
produce the same or similar goods or services143 or more broadly,
the entire manufacturing sector.144 To the extent that the reduced
tax rate and favorable tax reductions are not applicable to the
140
Guanyu Zai Fuwu Maoyi Chuangxin Fazhan Shidian Diqu Tuiguang Jishu
Xianjin Xing Fuwu Qiye Suodeshui Youhui Zhengce De Tongzhi (关于在服务贸易创新
发展试点地区推广技术先进行服务企业所得税优惠政策的通知) [Notice on the
Application of Corporate Income Tax Incentives for Advanced Technology Service
Enterprises in Pilot Areas for Innovative Development of Service Trade] （issued by the
Ministry of Finance, the State Taxation Administration, the Ministry of Commerce, the
Ministry of Science and Technology and the National Development and Reform
Commission Nov. 10, 2016), www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810755/c2399212/content.
html. The initial 15 pilot areas include Tianjin, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hangzhou, Hainan,
Wuhan, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Suzhou, Weihai, Harbin New Zone, Jiangbei New Zone,
Liangjiang New Zone and Guian New Zone. Guanyu Jiang Jishu Xianjin Xing Fuwu Qiye
Suodeshui Zhengce Tuiguang Zhi Quangguo Shishi De Tongzhi (关于将技术先进行服
务企业所得税政策推广至全国实施的通知) [The Notice on the Nationwide Application
of Corporate Income Tax Incentives for Advanced Technology Service Enterprises]
（issued by the Ministry of Finance, the State Taxation Administration, the Ministry of
Commerce, the Ministry of Science and Technology and the National Development and
Reform Commission Nov. 2, 2017), www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810755/c2908867/c
ontent.html.
141
Id. Notice on the Application of Corporate Income Tax Incentives for Advanced
Technology Service Enterprises in Pilot Areas for Innovative Development of Service
Trade (2016); Notice on the Nationwide Application of Corporate Income Tax Incentives
for Advanced Technology Service Enterprises (2017).
142
Id. Notice on the Application of Corporate Income Tax Incentives for Advanced
Technology Service Enterprises in Pilot Areas for Innovative Development of Service
Trade (2016); Notice on the Nationwide Application of Corporate Income Tax Incentives
for Advanced Technology Service Enterprises (2017).
143
Appellate Body Report, United States–Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, ¶ 373, WTO Doc.
WT/DS379/AB/R (adopted Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter US — Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties (China)].
144
See US — Aircraft (2nd complaint), supra note 82, ¶¶ 816–31.
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comparably situated entities, the tax incentives for HNTEs and
ATSEs constitute “financial contributions.” This analysis applies
to other tax preferences for the selected high-tech sectors.
In addition, it is worth noting that duty and tax exemptions
or remissions for exported products are excluded from being
treated as a financial contribution in the form of foregoing of
government revenue otherwise due.145 Therefore, value-added tax
(VAT) rebates are generally permitted under ASCM—as long as
the level of rebates does not go beyond the corresponding VAT
rates—and have been widely used by WTO Members. 146 This
exception does not apply to import duty exemptions.147 However,
a duty drawback scheme—that is, an import duty remission for
inputs imported for the production of goods destined for export—
falls within the exception provided that the remission does not
exceed the import duty actually levied.148 VAT rebates and duty
drawbacks have been a major component of China’s export
promotion policies.149 Recently, China made some adjustments to
its VAT rebate scheme by increasing the rebate rates for eligible
exports in general150 and allowing high-tech firms to use excess
input VAT credits.151 Since the rebate rates are not in excess of the
145

ASCM, supra note 17, art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii) n.1.
See generally Youssef Benzarti and Alisa Tazhitdinova, Do Value-Added Taxes
Affect International Trade Flows? Evidence from 30 Years of Tax Reforms (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 26195, 2019), www.nber.org/system/files/workin
g_papers/w26195/w26195.pdf.
147
See Appellate Body Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the
Automotive Industry, ¶¶ 91–92, WTO Doc. WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R (adopted
June 19, 2000).
148
Panel Report, European Union–Countervailing Measures on Certain
Polyethylene Terephthalate from Pakistan, ¶¶ 7.29-30, WTO Doc. WT/DS486/R (adopted
May 25, 2018); Appellate Body Report, European Union–Countervailing Measures on
Certain Polyethylene Terephthalate from Pakistan, ¶¶ 5.68, 5.97–5.134, WTO Doc.
WT/DS486/AB/R (adopted May 25, 2018).
149
See generally Chi-Chur Chao et al., China’s Import Duty Drawback and VAT
Rebate Policies: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 17 CHINA ECON. REV. 432 (2006).
150
Guanyu Tigao Bufen Chanpin Chukou Tuishui Lu De Gonggao (关于提高部
分产品出口退税率的公告) [Notice on Increasing Tax Rebate Rates for Certain Exports],
(issued by Ministry of Finance and State Taxation Administration Mar. 17, 2020),
www.chinatax.gov.cn/chinatax/n810341/n810755/c5146338/content.html.
151
Guanyu 2018 Nian Tuihuan Bufen Hangye Zengzhi Shui Liu Di Shuie
Youguan Shuishou Zhengce De Tongzhi (关于年退换部分行业增值税留抵税额有关税
收政策的通知) [Notice on Refunds to Excess VAT Credits in Certain Industries in 2018],
(issued by Ministry of Finance and State Taxation Administration June 27, 2018),
146

500

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 30 NO. 3

current VAT rate (13 percent), 152 the Chinese VAT scheme
remains immune from the subsidy rules. Nonetheless, it should be
noted that such policies are subject to the WTO nondiscrimination rules (e.g., GATT Articles I and III). In China –
Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, for example, China had
to cease its discriminatory application of VAT rebates for
domestic enterprises in the software and IC industry, allegedly
affecting around $2 billion worth of US exports to China.153 Thus,
while the ASCM largely leaves out VAT rebate policies from its
coverage, there are other rules that may be applied to restrain the
use of such policies. In this regard, the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism has proved effective in restraining China’s use of
subsidies in the high-tech sector and hence should continue to be
used for that purpose. 154 To the extent that VAT rebates may
distort trade and hurt trading partners, it is for WTO Members to
decide whether more discipline would be desirable via
negotiations. The current lack of discipline on VAT rebates under
the ASCM was agreed on by WTO Members and does not cause
a deficiency problem specific to China.
3. Provision of goods or services (other than general
infrastructure) or purchase of goods — The third category of
“financial contributions” concerns in-kind contributions in two
forms: (1) the provision of goods or services to, and (2) the
purchase of goods from, an enterprise by governments.155 While
the former may “lower artificially the cost of producing a product
by providing . . . inputs having a financial value”, the latter may
“increase artificially the revenues gained from selling the
product.”156 Goods or services may be provided through the grant
of relevant rights leading to the use or enjoyment of the goods or

www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810755/c3556358/content.html (The Notice provided
that the ten strategic sectors identified in the MIC 2025 should be prioritized for the refund
of excess VAT credits).
152
Id.
153
For an official summary of this dispute, see DS 309: China–Value-Added Tax
on Integrated Circuits, WTO, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds309_e.ht
m. For a discussion of the facts and settlement of the dispute, see WEIHUAN ZHOU, CHINA’S
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULINGS OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 17-9 (Oxford
and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2019).
154
Id.
155
See ASCM, supra note 17, art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii).
156
See US — Soft Lumber IV, supra note 83, ¶ 53.
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services. For example, in US – Softwood Lumber IV, the Appellate
Body found that Canada’s provincial stumpage arrangements
amounted to a provision of goods by giving the eligible enterprises
the right to cut standing timber and enjoy exclusive rights over the
timber harvested.157 It ruled that the term “provide” requires “a
reasonably proximate relationship between the action of the
government . . . and the use or enjoyment of the good or service
by the recipient”, and also the government to “have some control
over the availability of” the thing being provided.158 Applying this
reasoning, in US – Carbon Steel (India), the Appellate Body held
that the grant of mining rights for iron ore and coal by the Indian
government had a “reasonably proximate relationship” with “the
use or enjoyment of the minerals by the beneficiaries of those
rights.”159 In US – Aircraft (2nd complaint), the Appellate Body
ruled that the provision of goods or services may be “done
gratuitously or in exchange for consideration,” and hence captured
the provision of access to NASA/USDOD facilities, equipment,
and employees in exchange for scientific and technical
information produced by Boeing.160
The provision of goods or services in the form of “general
infrastructure” is explicitly excluded from the coverage of
subparagraph (iii). Thus, a distinction must be made between
“infrastructure of a general nature” and other infrastructure.161 In
EC – Aircraft, the panel observed that “general infrastructure”
refers to “infrastructure that is not provided to or for the advantage
of only a single entity or limited group of entities, but rather is
available to all or nearly all entities.” 162 Therefore, even the
provision of railroads or electrical distribution systems may fall
within the ambit of subparagraph (iii) if they are made available
only to a limited group of entities.163 Such limitations on access to
or use of the infrastructure may arise in law—e.g., where the
infrastructure is created for certain entities particular needs—or in
effect—e.g., where although an explicit limitation is absent, only
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Id. ¶¶ 68–76.
Id. ¶ 71.
See US — Carbon Steel (India), supra note 93, ¶¶ 4.60–4.74.
See US — Aircraft (2nd complaint), supra note 82,¶¶ 616, 623–24.
See US — Soft Lumber IV, supra note 83, ¶ 60.
See EC – Aircraft, supra note 89, ¶ 7.1036.
Id. ¶ 7.1039.
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certain entities have access to the infrastructure.164 Based on these
observations, the panel found sufficient evidence to show that the
facilities involved were created for use by Airbus although they
were also intended to serve certain public policy goals and may be
open for public use in the future.165
The provision of production inputs, particularly land and
electricity, at preferential rates has been prevalent in the Chinese
high-tech sector.166 For example, in order to attract the world’s
leading tech firms to establish research centres in the Guangxi
Zhuang Autonomous Region, the local government currently
provides land use right for free for the first three years and at half
price for another two years.167 Similarly, to accelerate the growth
of the Linyi High-Tech Zone in Shandong province, the local
government offers a 15% discount of land use fees, preferential
access to electricity, water, and other essential resources and
facilities, amongst a variety of other supportive policies. 168 In
Hubei province, high-tech companies in the Guanggu Future TechCity are entitled to discounted electricity rates leading to an annual
cost saving of approximately RMB 150 million.169 The Guizhou
provincial government recently reduced the electricity rate to
RMB 0.35/Kilowatt hour for big data companies in Guian New
Zone and for all 5G base stations in the region (in light of the New
Infrastructure Initiative discussed in Section II) while the standard
rate for industrial use is between RMB 0.48-0.64/Kilowatt hour.170
164

Id. ¶ 7.1043.
Id. ¶¶ 7.1080–1084.
See, e.g., Mandy Meng Fang, A Crisis or An Opportunity? The Trade War
between the US and China in the Solar PV Sector, 54 J. OF WORLD TRADE 103 (2020).
167
广西壮族自治区人民政府关于实施创新驱动发展战略的决定 [Decision on
Implementing the Plan of Innovation Driven Development] (promulgated by the Guangxi
Zhuang Autonomous Region Government, Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.waizi.org.cn/poli
cy/81312.html.
168
临 沂 高 新 技 术 产 业 开 发 区 招 商 引 资 的 有 关 规 定 [Regulations on the
Business and Investment Invitation in Linyi High-Tech Industrial Development Zone]
(promulgated by Linyi Municipal Government, Dec. 5, 2019) § 3 art. 2, www.lytoday.co
m/kfly/yhzc/2013-12/17/content_1600.htm.
169
Jin Ji, Shen Jia, & Zhao Jingwen, High-tech Enterprises in Guanggu Future
High City Enjoy Preferential Electricity Prices, SINA NEWS (May 25, 2014), http://news.
sina.com.cn/o/2014-05-24/054030218040.shtml.
170
It is reported that Huawei, Apple and Tencent will establish their big data
centres in Guian New Zone as planned. See New Infrastructure Brings New Development
Opportunities for Big Data Industry in Guizhou, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Apr. 22, 2020),
165
166
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There is little doubt that these measures are input subsidies in the
form of provision of goods or services (i.e. electricity distribution
and water allocation). Although these subsidies involve land and
electricity generation and distribution, only selected industries,
projects or companies are eligible for preferential access and
discounted rates.171
Another major form of input subsidies is the provision of
input materials, such as steel, aluminum, and a range of raw
materials and rare earths (e.g. bauxite, iron ores, coking coal) that
are essential for the high-tech sector.172 The key concern here is
related to the significant market distortions in these upstream
industries which have long been subject to industrial policies and
dominated by SOEs.173 However, as will be discussed in the subsections below, this concern is not so much about whether the
provision of input materials constitutes a type of “financial
contributions” but about (1) whether the input suppliers are
“public bodies” and (2) whether these inputs are supplied at less
than adequate remuneration so that a benefit is conferred on the
downstream users in the high-tech sector. In practice, energy and

http://sciTechnologypeople.com.cn/n1/2020/0422/c432330-31683603.html; Press Release,
Guizhou Communications Administration, Guizhou Autonomous Prefecture Issues Policy
to Reduce the Cost of Electricity Generation for 5G Industry and Promote Industrial
Development, (July 23, 2020),
http://gzca.miit.gov.cn/xwdt/gzdt/art/2020/art_3b5055f9baab4c5693b7c730ad2eda
ac.html.
171
See Jin et al. supra note 169; New Infrastructure Brings New Development
Opportunities for Big Data Industry in Guizhou, supra note 170; 广西壮族自治区人民政
府关于实施创新驱动发展战略的决定 [Decision on Implementing the Plan of Innovation
Driven Development]; 临沂高新技术产业开发区招商引资的有关规定 [Regulations on
the Business and Investment Invitation in Linyi High-Tech Industrial Development Zone];
Guizhou Autonomous Prefecture Issues Policy to Reduce the Cost of Electricity Generation
for 5G Industry and Promote Industrial Development, supra note 170.
172
See generally OECD, A First Look at the Steel Industry in the Context of Global
Value Chains, DSTI/SC(2017)4 (Mar. 16, 2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/DSTI/S
C(2017)4/en/pdf; OECD, Measuring Distortions in International Markets: the Aluminum
Value Chain, (OECD Trade Policy Papers No. 218, 2019), www.oecdilibrary.org/trade/measuring-distortions-in-international-markets-the-aluminium-valuechain_c82911ab-en [hereinafter OECD Aluminum Report]; WAYNE M. MORRISON &
RACHEL TANG, CONG. RES. SERV., CHINA’S RARE EARTH INDUSTRY AND EXPORT
REGIME: ECONOMIC AND TRADE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1–4 (2012),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42510.pdf.
173
OECD Aluminum Report, supra note 172; MORRISON & TANG, supra note 172,
at 1–4.
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material input subsidies have been some of the most frequent
targets in countervailing actions against China.174
The other category of in-kind contributions under
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the ASCM concerns governments’
purchase of goods. The case law has clarified that such purchases
are usually for consideration 175 and may involve a government
acquiring things for its own use or for others to use, such as resale
to end users of electricity. 176 However, although the text of
subparagraph (iii) does not include purchases of “services”, in
US – Aircraft (2nd complaint) the Appellate Body did not endorse
the panel’s decision that the drafters of the ASCM intended to
exclude purchases of services, thereby leaving this question open
for discussion in future disputes.177
Government procurement has been an important driver of
indigenous innovation in China.178 A series of national policies
and regulatory documents, which are also implemented through
numerous local government policies, mandated or encouraged
preferential government procurement of high-tech products and
services supplied by qualified Chinese entities. 179 The NEV
174
See generally CAPITAL TRADE INCORPORATED, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND
SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, AN ASSESSMENT OF CHINA’S SUBSIDIES TO STRATEGIC
AND HEAVYWEIGHT INDUSTRIES, (Mar. 23, 2009), www.uscc.gov/research/assessmentchinas-subsidies-strategic-and-heavyweight-industries.
175
See US — Aircraft (2nd complaint), supra note 82, ¶ 620.
176
Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy
Generation Sector/Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WTO Doc.
WT/DS412/R, WT/DS426/R (May 24, 2013), ¶¶ 7.225–7.227; Appellate Body Report,
Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation
Sector/Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R,
WT/DS426/AB/R (May 24, 2013), ¶ 5.124.
177
See US — Aircraft (2nd complaint), supra note 82, ¶ 620.
178
See generally U.S.-CHINA BUS. COUNCIL, UPDATE: CHINA’S INNOVATION &
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT POLICIES (May 2015), www.uschina.org/reports/updatechinas-innovation-government-procurement-policies.
179
See, e.g., The National Medium- and Long-Term Science and Technology
Development Plan for 2006-2020, supra note 25; 自主创新产品政府采购评审办法
[Notice on the Assessment Criteria of Government Procurement of Home-Grown
Innovation Products] (promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, Apr. 3, 2007), ST. COUNCIL
GAZ., Feb. 5, 2008, chap. III, www.gov.cn/ztzl/kjfzgh/content_883671.htm; 自主创新产
品政府采购预算管理办法 [Notice on the Measures of Administrating the Budget for
Government Procurement of Home-Grown Innovation Products], (promulgated by the
Ministry of Finance, Apr. 3, 2007), ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Feb. 5, 2008, www.gov.cn/ztzl/kj
fzgh/content_883710.htm. However, it is noted that the latter two policies were phased out
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industry, for instance, has been a major beneficiary of such
policies that set specific NEV purchase targets for government
entities and public institutions at both national and local levels.180
One of the most recent policy developments is an opinion issued
by the State Council which encourages government entities to
increase purchases of innovative technologies, goods, and
services from medium and small-sized tech firms in High-Tech
Industrial Development Zones.181 It is anticipated that this policy
will be implemented in the 168 high-tech zones currently listed by
the Ministry of Science and Technology. 182 Like government
provision of goods or services, the major issue relating to the
preferential public procurement of high-tech goods is not whether
it constitutes a “financial contribution” but whether the purchases
are made at more than adequate remuneration. Although the issue
of whether government purchases of services may be treated as
“financial contributions” remains unsettled, this lack of clarity
does not create a problem that is specific to China, and any further
development of the case law will apply to all WTO Members.
Moreover, it is worth noting that China is actively
negotiating to join the WTO Agreement on Government
Procurement which sets forth rules (e.g., non-discrimination) on
government procurement activities that are not available under the

in 2011 by the Ministry of Finance. For a summary of some of the national and local
policies, see U.S.-China Bus. Council, supra note 178. For a general discussion of
government procurement in the high-tech sector, see Daniel C.K. Chow, China’s
Indigenous Innovation Policies and the World Trade Organization, 34 NW. J. INT’L LAW
& BUS. 81 (2013).
180
关于印发政府机关及公共机构购买新能源汽车实施方案的通知 [Notice on
Issuing the implementation Plan of Government Agencies and Public Institutions’
Purchases of New Energy Vehicles] (promulgated by the Government Offices
Administration of the State Council, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Science and
Technology, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the National
Development and Reform Commission on July 14, 2014, www.caam.org.cn/chn/9/cate_9
9/con_5124489.html.
181
See 关于促进国家高新技术产业开发区高质量发展的若干意见 [Opinions
on Enhancing the High-Quality Development of National High-Tech Industrial Zones]
(promulgated by the State Council, July 13, 2020), ST. COUNCIL GAZ. July 17, 2020, ¶ 8,
www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2020-07/17/content_5527765.htm.
182
High-Tech Industrial Development Zone, MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, www.most.gov.cn/gxjscykfq/.
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existing WTO agreements. 183 China proposed enhancing its
market access commitments by broadening the scope of covered
procurement to include goods and services sectors within strategic
industries. 184 These rules and commitments would provide
additional, more specific discipline on China’s government
procurement activities, thereby reducing the need to resort to the
ASCM.
In addition, China is subject to an even broader WTO-plus
obligation regarding the purchase and sale activities of SOEs and
State-invested enterprises (SIEs). Section 6.1 of the Accession
Protocol, as elaborated by paragraph 46 of the Working Party
Report, requires the Chinese government to ensure that:
[A]ll state-owned and state-invested enterprises
would make purchases and sales based solely on
commercial considerations, e.g. price, quality,
marketability and availability, and that the
enterprises of other WTO Members would have
an adequate opportunity to compete for sales to
and purchases from these enterprises on nondiscriminatory terms and conditions. In addition,
the Government of China would not influence,
directly or indirectly, commercial decisions on
the part of state-owned or state-invested
enterprises, including on the quantity, value or
country of origin of any goods purchased or sold,
except in a manner consistent with the WTO
Agreement.185
While this obligation has never been utilized before, hence its
exact scope remains debatable, it seems to go beyond a mere nondiscrimination rule and provide a more comprehensive restriction
on the anti-competitive conduct of SOEs and SIEs including
183
The Agreement on Government Procurement is a plurilateral agreement that
applies to signatories only. For an official introduction of the agreement, see WTO and
Government Procurement, WORLD TRADE ORG., www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/
gproc_e.htm. For a discussion of the application of the relevant WTO rules on government
procurement in China’s high-tech sector, see Chow, supra note 179, at 98–104.
184
China Submits Revised Offer for Joining Government Procurement Pact,
WORLD TRADE ORG. (Oct. 23, 2019), www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/gpro_23o
ct19_e.htm.
185
See Working Party Report, supra 78, ¶ 46.
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government purchases and sales of goods and services.186 Thus,
the ASCM is not, nor is it intended to be, the sole source of
discipline on government procurement and sales activities that
may cause market distortions and adversely affect other WTO
Members.
4. Income or price support — Article 1.1(a)(2) sets out a
residual category, namely, “any form of income or price support”
within the meaning of Article XVI of the GATT. While this
category has further broadened the “range of government
measures capable of providing subsidies,” 187 its exact scope of
coverage remains unsettled. In China – GOES, the panel rejected
an effect-based approach to the determination of “price
support.” 188 The contested measure was the voluntary restraint
agreements (VRAs) concluded under the US Steel Import
Stabilization Act 1984 which restricted the volume of steel
imports into the US market.189 China contended that the VRAs
effectively raised domestic steel prices, thereby causing a transfer
of wealth from steel purchasers to the US steel industry.190 The
panel held that whether a government action constitutes a covered
subsidy should be “determined by reference to the
action . . . concerned, rather than . . . the effects of the measure on
a market.”191 More specifically, the term “price support”, in the
panel’s view, “does not include all government intervention that
may have an effect on prices, such as tariffs and quantitative
restrictions.” 192 Rather, it concerns “direct government
intervention in the market with the design to fix the price of a good
at a particular level, for example, through purchase of surplus
production when price is set above equilibrium” as opposed to “a
random change in price merely being a side-effect of any form of

186
For a more detailed discussion of this obligation (in comparison to GATT
Article XVII:1 on State Trading Enterprises), see Weihuan Zhou et al., Building A Market
Economy Through WTO-Inspired Reform of State-Owned Enterprises in China, 68 INT’L
& COMP. L.Q. 977, 997–1001, 1011–12 (2019).
187
See US – Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 83, ¶ 52.
188
See generally Panel Report, China Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on
Grain Oriented Flat-rolled Electrical Steel from the United States, WTO Doc.
WT/DS414/R (June 15, 2012).
189
Id. ¶¶ 7.35, 7.79.
190
Id.
191
Id. ¶ 7.85.
192
Id. ¶ 7.85.
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government measure.”193 Since the VRAs did not involve direct
control of price by the US government, the panel rejected China’s
claim that they constituted a subsidy in the form of price
support. 194 To date, this ruling remains the only detailed
consideration of the meaning of “income or price support.”
Nevertheless, the effect-based approach to the determination of
subsidies has been consistently rejected in other disputes. For
example, in US – Export Restraints, the panel refused to treat
export restraints as a “financial contribution” despite their
potential trade-distorting effect.195
We did not identify any measure that directly sets price or
income levels in China’s high-tech sector. As a result of the case
law above, measures that may cause price distortions indirectly
may not be captured by this residual category. One such measure
that has been hotly debated in recent years concerns China’s
export restraints, mainly in the form of export quotas and taxes,
on raw materials and rare earths. 196 While these measures are
apparently adopted to protect the security of exhaustible natural
resources and the environment,197 they may cause domestic input
prices to fall, thereby conferring a cost advantage on downstream
entities in the high-tech sector, such as semiconductors and
NEVs.198 Despite the potential price effects, export restraints do
not amount to a government’s direct control of price in light of the
panel decision in US – Export Restraints. Therefore, whether they
may constitute a covered subsidy remains debatable.199
However, as discussed above, the ASCM is not the sole
source of discipline that may be employed to tackle trade193

Id. ¶ 7.86 (emphasis added).
Id. ¶ 7.88.
195
See Panel Report, United States — Measures Treating Exports Restraints as
Subsidies, WTO doc. WT/DS194/R (adopted Aug. 23, 2001) ¶¶ 8.62–8.75.
196
See Bown & Hillman, supra note 53, at 568–69, 574.
197
《中 国 的 稀 土 状 况 与 政 策》[Situations and Policies of China’s Rare
Earth Industry], INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, (June 20, 2012),
www.gov.cn/zhengce/2012-06/20/content_2618561.htm.
198
See Marco Bronckers & Keith Maskus, China — Raw Materials: A
Controversial Step Towards Evenhanded Exploitation of Natural Resources, 13 WORLD
TRADE REVIEW 393, 402–04 (2014).
199
But see Jackson, World Trade and the Law of the GATT, supra note 54, at 383–
84 (arguing that the negotiating history of GATT Article XVI:1 has suggested that the
definition of subsidy may be broadly interpreted to cover indirect subsidies that increase
the export of any products).
194
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distortive export measures or price distortions. Under the general
WTO rules, all export restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges are prohibited under GATT Article XI:1. Anti-dumping
duties have been routinely applied to address price distortions
derived from the raw materials market affecting the price of final
goods.200
In addition, China has undertaken two relevant WTO-plus
obligations. Under Section 11.3 of its Accession Protocol, China
agrees to “eliminate all taxes and charges applied to exports”
except for a list of 84 tariff items subject to a bound export duty
from 20 to 50 percent. Many raw materials, such as bauxite, coke,
fluorspar, magnesium, silicon metal, zinc, and a wide spectrum of
rare earths, are not included in the list and hence must not be
subject to export taxes. 201 This WTO-plus obligation has been
applied to successfully challenge China’s export taxes on raw
materials and rare earths in two consecutive disputes. 202 This
obligation significantly limited China’s policy space in using
export taxes for legitimate regulatory goals, while other WTO
Members are free to and do apply such taxes for similar goals.203
More broadly, China also undertakes to “allow prices for
traded goods and services in every sector to be determined by
market forces” under Section 9.1 of the Accession Protocol. Only
a short list of exempted goods and services – which does not cover
the strategic high-tech sectors – may be subject to government

200
See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures
on Biodiesel from Argentina, WT/DS473/AB/R (adopted Oct. 26, 2016). For a detailed
discussion of this report, see Weihuan Zhou, Appellate Body Report on EU−Biodiesel: The
Future of China’s State Capitalism under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, (2018)17(4)
World Trade Review 603.
201
Accession Protocol, supra note 77, Annex 6.
202
See WTO Panel Report, China — Measures Related to the Exportation of
Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R (adopted
Feb. 22, 2012); Appellate Body Report, China — Measures Related to the Exportation of
Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R (adopted
Feb. 22, 2012). WTO Panel Report, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare
Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/R, WT/DS432/R, WT/DS433/R (adopted
Aug. 29, 2014); Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of
Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/AB/R, WT/DS432/AB/R,
WT/DS433/AB/R (adopted Aug. 29, 2014).
203
Jeonghoi Kim, ‘Recent Trends in Export Restrictions on Raw Materials’ in
OECD, The Economic Impact of Export Restrictions on Raw Materials (Paris, OECD
Publishing, 2010) 15–20.
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pricing or government guidance pricing. 204 Apparently, this
obligation has the potential to extend beyond “price or income
control” to capture Chinese government intervention in all sectors,
other than the few exemptions, where it affects prices directly or
indirectly, although its exact scope of application will need to be
tested in future disputes.205 Despite its potential, this obligation
has never been utilized by WTO Members to challenge the
allegedly wide-ranging activities of the Chinese government,
including those through SOEs and SIEs that may have prevented
prices from being determined by market forces. Therefore, while
it is worthwhile for there to be further discussion about whether
the ASCM may or should be expanded to apply to export restraints
or other types of price-distortive measures that do not explicitly
take the form of the covered subsidies, it is also important to
recognize that the other WTO rules, particularly the broad Chinaspecific obligations, already offer certain solutions to the
challenges arising from State intervention and market distortions
in China.
B. Public Body
The interpretation of what constitutes a “public body”
under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the ASCM is critical to ensuring that
only the conduct of governments is captured. In its landmark
decision in US – Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties (China),
the Appellate Body developed a “function/authority-based”
approach to the determination of “public body” while rejecting an
“ownership-based” approach proposed by the US and applied by
the panel to decide that China’s State-owned commercial banks
were “public bodies” just because these entities were majority
owned or controlled by the Chinese government. 206 More
specifically, the Appellate Body ruled that a “public
body . . . must be an entity that possesses, exercises or is vested
with governmental authority” to exercise governmental
functions.207 Such authority may be established based on evidence
showing “an explicit statutory delegation” or “a sustained and
204
205
206
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systematic practice.” 208 The existence of mere formal links
between an entity and government, such as the government
holding a majority interest in the entity, in itself is unlikely to be
sufficient evidence.209 However, “where the evidence shows that
the formal indicia of government control are manifold, and there
is also evidence that such control has been exercised in a
meaningful way, then such evidence may permit an inference that
the entity concerned is exercising governmental authority.”210 In
any event, the determination of whether an entity is a “public body”
requires consideration of all relevant characteristics or features of
the entity, its relationship with government, and must not be
exclusively or unduly based on any single characteristic.211 While
rejecting the panel’s interpretative approach, the Appellate Body
upheld the panel’s ultimate finding that the Chinese State-owned
commercial banks constituted “public bodies” based on evidence
relating to (1) state ownership, (2) laws that mandate or request
implementation or consideration of government policies, and (3)
influence of the government or the Communist Party of China
(hereinafter CPC or Party) on management and decisionmaking.212
Most recently, the Appellate Body revisited the
“function/authority-based” approach in detail in US –
Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.5).213 This dispute
arose out of the United States’ continued application of the
“ownership-based” approach in finding that Chinese SOEs and
SIEs providing inputs for the production of certain goods,
including certain pipes, steel and aluminium products, wind power,
and solar panels, were “public bodies” in a range of countervailing
investigations. 214 The panel found the US in breach of
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Article 1.1(a)(1) in the original proceedings.215 In the compliance
proceedings, the US primarily relied on a Public Bodies
Memorandum (accompanied by a CPC Memorandum) and
China’s responses to the Public Body Questionnaire, which
included evidence to support the “authority-based” approach.216
In addition to government ownership, the evidence included, inter
alia, China’s national industrial policies, the role of the Chinese
government and the CPC in the firms’ management and
governance, the provision of direct and indirect benefits to
incentivize the firms to follow the policy directives, and the
influence of these policies, government/Party role and incentives
on the firms’ behaviour and activities. 217 The Memorandum
concluded that (1) all SOEs are “public bodies”; (2) SIEs may be
subject to government industrial policies, hence exercising
governmental functions; (3) entities with little or no formal
government ownership may be controlled or influenced by the
Chinese government in a meaningful manner; and (4) the control
of the Party is equivalent to the control of the State.218 China’s
core contention was that the United States’ authorities failed to
apply the correct legal test. More specifically, China submitted
that the “authority-based” test “require[s] a particular degree or
nature of connection in all cases between an identified government
function and the particular financial contribution at issue,” and
hence cannot be satisfied by “an abstract review of China’s system
of governance and state functions.”219 Both the compliance panel
and the Appellate Body disagreed. The Appellate Body clarified
that the focus of the test is on the entity concerned and its
relationship with government as opposed to the conduct alleged to
give rise to a “financial contribution” although evidence relating
to conduct may be indicative of the underlying functions of the
entity.220 Therefore, it is unnecessary to show that the entity is
215
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“meaningfully controlled” by the government in the specific
conduct.221 Once an entity is found to be a “public body,” then all
its conduct “is directly attributable to” the government of the
Member concerned.222 Although the Appellate Body refused to
consider whether the Public Bodies Memorandum is in violation
of Article 1.1(a)(1), 223 its decision suggested that evidence
showing a sufficient degree of government control of the activities
of an entity in general leading to the exercise of governmental
functions by the entity would satisfy the “authority-based” test.224
The “authority-based” test has been one of the most
criticized elements of the current subsidy rules.225 Many believe
that given China’s State-led economic model and the dominant
role of SOEs in economic activities, this test creates a substantial
hurdle to identifying “public bodies” and is consequently deficient
in tackling subsidies granted via SOEs.226 This issue is a major
ground for reforms of the subsidy rules proposed by the US-EUJapan joint statement227 and by Bown and Hillman.228
The “authority-based” approach is preferable to the
“ownership-based” approach. 229 This is because under that
approach, the definition of “public body” does not overreach to
cover all SOEs or SIEs, regardless of whether an entity exercises
a public policy function as an agent of governments or purely
engages in commercial activities. Since public sectors remain
significant in many countries,230 an adoption of the “ownershipbased” approach may well cause an issue of over-inclusiveness
and attract the same degree of criticisms as its counterpart has
received. More importantly, the WTO tribunals’ application of the
“authority-based” approach is reasonably balanced by requiring
221
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some evidence beyond ownership without imposing excessively
high evidentiary standards. As the major evidence required under
the “authority-based” approach, China’s industrial policies,
directives, and other regulatory instruments as well as the
involvement of the State/Party in corporate management and
governance are widely documented and are readily accessible
nowadays. 231 In addition, China’s ongoing SOE reforms have
explicitly classified certain entities as Public Welfare SOEs and
Special Commercial SOEs to undertake governmental functions
and have mandated the creation of a Party Committee in all SOEs
to influence the decision-making of these entities.232 These recent
developments provide more positive evidence to support findings
of “public bodies.” In reality, investigating authorities in major
jurisdictions have already collected abundant evidence and have
often resorted to other relevant evidence collected by each other
in countervailing investigations. 233 Significantly, the Appellate
Body’s ruling that the “public body” determination does not
require one to show that the specific conduct of the entity
concerned is “meaningfully controlled” by the Chinese
government further reduced the evidentiary burden on
investigating authorities. Therefore, the totality of the evidence
identified above would be sufficient to establish a prime facie case
which would be difficult for the Chinese government to rebut. In
both disputes where the “authority-based” approach was
developed and applied, the WTO tribunals did not disagree with
the investigating authorities on the findings that the evidence on
the record was sufficient to show China’s State banks and
SOEs/SIEs providing inputs to manufacture were meaningfully
controlled by the Chinese government to exercise governmental
functions. Similarly, it would not be hard to establish that the
investment funds discussed in sub-section A(i) are “public bodies”

231
China has made most laws, regulations and policies available online as part of
its WTO obligations on transparency. See generally Henry Gao, ‘The WTO’s Transparency
Obligations and China’ (2017)12(2) J. COMPAR. L.Q. 329. For discussions of the
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SYSTEM: THE SPECIAL CASE OF CHINA (James Nedumpara & Weihuan Zhou eds., 2018).
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based on the majority ownership of the Chinese government,234
the relevant industrial policies, and other evidence showing that
the funds are essentially government investment vehicles vested
with the authority to promote the growth of the selected industries.
In short, while one may continue to debate the legitimacy and
efficacy of the “authority-based” test, the case law seems to have
evolved in a direction that makes “public bodies” easier to prove
than to defend.
C. Private Entities “Entrusted or Directed”
While the ASCM is primarily concerned with the conduct
of governments, it does not ignore the possibility that Members
may circumvent their obligations by making a financial
contribution indirectly through a private entity.235 To prevent such
circumvention, it provides that the conduct of a private entity may
also constitute the provision of subsidies if it is “entrusted” or
“directed” by governments to do so. 236 The key interpretative
issue, therefore, concerns the meaning of “entrustment” and
“direction.” In US – DRAMs, the Appellate Body observed that
these terms, respectively, involve the giving of responsibility to
(entrustment) or exercise of authority over (direction) an entity, as
a proxy of government, in both formal and informal ways “in
order to effectuate a financial contribution.”237 Both terms require
“a demonstrable link between the government and the conduct of
the private body” and “a more active role [of the government] than
mere acts of encouragement,” and hence do not cover any
government intervention which may or may not lead to the
conduct of the private entity.238 In this regard, the panel found that
despite (1) the existence of a bailout policy seeking to prevent the
234
For example, the major shareholders of the first tranche of the IC Fund included
the Ministry of Finance (25.95%), China Development Bank Finance (23.07%), China
National Tobacco (14.42%), and Beijing E-Town International Investment and
Development (7.21%), and China Mobile (7.21%). See Yanpeng Chen, The Second
Tranche of the National IC Fund Continues to Focus on Semiconductors and May Attract
More Than 1 Trillion Private Investment, SINA NEWS (June 16, 2020),
https://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2020-06-16/doc-iirczymk7375390.shtml.
235
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financial collapse of Hynix and (2) the fact that the Korean
government had some capacity to influence the private body
creditors, the evidence did not demonstrate that the Korean
government “availed itself of that capacity to entrust or direct” the
creditors to participate in the bailout.239 The Appellate Body later
overturned the panel’s finding on the ground that the panel
examined individual pieces of evidence in isolation rather than the
totality of the evidence.240 However, the Appellate Body did not
consider whether the evidence before the panel, in its totality, was
sufficient to substantiate “entrustment or direction.”241
Subsequent decisions offer more guidance on the
evidentiary standard for “entrustment” and “direction.” For
example, in dealing with similar issues relating to the participation
of private body creditors in the bailout of Hynix in Japan –
DRAMs (Korea), the Appellate Body dismissed the panel’s
observation that entrustment or direction cannot be established if
a financial transaction (such as a loan) is undertaken on
commercial terms, although “the commercial unreasonableness of
the financial transactions is a relevant factor.” 242 Instead, the
Appellate Body opined that a “government could entrust or direct
a creditor to make a loan, which that creditor then does on
commercial terms.” 243 This suggests that the establishment of
“entrustment” or “direction” does not rely on whether the financial
contribution concerned confers a benefit. In the context of
interpreting “public body” in US – Anti-dumping and
Countervailing Duties (China), the Appellate Body confirmed
that like the term “public,” the term “private” also “encompass[es]
notions of authority as well as of control.”244 As suggested by the
Appellate Body in US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article
21.5), the major difference is that if conduct is carried out by a
private entity, then it must be demonstrated that a “link” exists
“between the government and that [specific] conduct” in the form
239
WTO Panel Report, United States — Countervailing Duty Investigation on
Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMs) from Korea, WT/DS296/R
(adopted July 20, 2005), ¶ 7.177.
240
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241
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244
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of “entrustment or direction,” which is not required in the
determination of “public body” as discussed above. 245
Accordingly, in US – Supercalendered Paper, the panel held that
a measure that merely imposed a general obligation on an entity
to provide electricity service did not amount to an “entrustment or
direction” of the entity to provide such service to a specific
customer at any given rate. 246 This ruling confirms that
“entrustment or direction cannot be inadvertent or a mere byproduct of governmental regulation” 247 and that additional
evidence is needed to show the conduct concerned is entrusted or
directed by a government.
The concern about the role of private entities in China has
two major, related claims. The more extreme claim is that given
the complicated web of relationships between the State, the Party,
and firms in China, all firms may be influenced by the
government. 248 This claim indicates that the entire Chinese
economy is distorted by State intervention. While one cannot deny
that such State/Party-Firm relationships or networks exist,
evidence on the actual or even potential impact on the decisions
of private firms is much less robust compared with the evidence
of such impact on SOEs. 249 In contrast, recent studies tend to
suggest the opposite. As leading China expert Nicholas Lardy has
observed, with the increasingly significant role of private firms in
the Chinese economy, “most markets are now competitive.” 250
Even with the recent resurgence of the role of the State and SOEs,
State influence remains concentrated in selected sectors and
private firms have continued to maintain financial performance
and efficiency at levels considerably higher than those of SOEs.251
Thus, it is unjustified to regard all business activities of private
245
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firms as being directed by the Chinese government. Rather,
whether such activities are so directed or influenced must be
established on a case-by-case basis. This view lends support to the
interpretative approach developed by the Appellate Body
requiring the demonstration of “entrustment” or “direction” of the
specific conduct concerned.
The other claim is that given the industrial policies and
the significant involvement of the State in market activities in
selected sectors, including the high-tech sector, private firms are
incentivized to increase business activities in these sectors and
even to grant financial or other support to certain firms or projects
pursuant to the instructions of governments in exchange for
business opportunities and other commercial benefits. 252 This
claim has merit if one considers China’s New Infrastructure
Initiative and government-led investment funds in the high-tech
sector which have promoted massive and growing private
investment in the selected industries as discussed earlier. 253
However, the possibility that private actors may be so incentivized
does not necessarily mean they are acting in the interest of the
government instead of their own in all cases. Maintaining a good
relationship with governments, making an investment based on
policy and regulatory developments, or running a short-term loss
for long-term benefits are typical examples of reasonable
commercial decisions. Such conduct is by no means conclusive as
to whether a private entity exercises a governmental function.
Again, an inquiry into whether the contested conduct is entrusted
or directed by governments would be needed.
To this end, one may remain concerned about the
State/Party’s “invisible hand” in the Chinese economy that may
effectively influence private firms’ conduct similarly to how it
influences State entities.254 However, whether the degree, breadth,
and effectiveness of such influence is actually similar requires
more solid empirical evidence. The Chinese government is
significantly more inclined to use SOEs rather than private entities
to implement policy objectives, hence the extensive support for
252
See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt and Wentong Zheng, ‘Beyond Ownership:
State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm’, (2015)103 Georgetown Law Journal 665, 683–88.
253
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the former to the detriment of the latter.255 This also suggests that
the conduct of private entities must not be presumed to be
entrusted or directed by governments. Accordingly, we submit
that the current law on subsidies strikes a proper balance by
including private entities as potential suppliers of subsidies while
imposing a higher evidentiary standard for establishing that such
entities actually act for the government as compared with the
evidence required in establishing SOEs as “public bodies.” This
balanced approach reasonably reflects the focus of WTO rules on
the conduct of governments as opposed to that of corporate
entities especially private ones.256 The more remotely an entity is
related to a government, the higher the evidentiary standard
should be in establishing that the conduct of the entity is
attributable to the government. To the extent that this higher
evidentiary standard makes it more difficult for a complainant to
prove “entrustment” or “direction” than for a respondent to defend,
the escalation is logical and the difficulty applies to all WTO
Members as amply demonstrated in past disputes such as those
involving Korea’s bailout of Hynix through private creditors.257
Therefore, even accepting that the current legal test creates certain
problems due to the high evidentiary standard in identifying
subsidies through private entities, the problems are not specific to
China. If the Chinese government decides to further strengthen its
“control” of or “influence” on private entities,258 it only provides
more evidence for other countries to establish “entrustment” or
“direction.”
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D. Benefits Conferred
A government action that constitutes a “financial
contribution” or “price or income support” would not be regarded
as a “subsidy” unless it has conferred a benefit to the recipient.259
In developing the legal test of “benefit conferred,” WTO tribunals
have relied on Article 14 as an immediate context.260 In essence,
Article 14 states that the calculation of benefit shall be based on
the extent to which a financial contribution has been made “on
terms more favourable than those available to the recipient in the
market.”261 Accordingly, the test of “benefit conferred” focuses on
the “recipient” or “benefit to the recipient” rather than the
government/subsidy provider or “cost to government.”262 Thus, in
EC – Aircraft, the mere fact that government investment in
infrastructure exceeded its return on that investment, though
relevant, was not determinative of whether a benefit was
conferred.263 Rather, one needs to compare the situations with or
without the government action, that is, whether the action made
the recipient “better off” than it would have been in the absence
of it.264 The benchmark for comparison is the marketplace such
that the central inquiry is whether a financial contribution is
provided “on terms more advantageous than those [that would
have been] available to the recipient in the market” at the time the
contribution is made.265 Therefore, for example, if the financial
contribution is in the form of a government loan, then it would
constitute a subsidy only if it has been granted on terms more
favourable than those of a comparable commercial loan in the
market at the time the loan is provided.266 This timing requirement
means that “the determination of benefit . . . is an ex ante analysis
259
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that does not depend on how the particular financial contribution
actually performed after it was granted.” 267 The benchmark
analysis requires consideration of all relevant evidence including,
inter alia, “the terms that would result from unconstrained
exchange in the relevant market” and/or the commercial
rationality of the financial contribution concerned, that is, whether
the contribution is made based on commercial considerations.268
One of the most controversial issues in the
benefit/benchmark analysis concerns the determination of an
appropriate benchmark, especially when a market is dominated or
heavily influenced by governments.269 In US – Softwood Lumber
IV, the US authority found that Canadian stumpage fees did not
reflect competitive market prices and hence used external
benchmarks to determine the magnitude of benefit under Article
14(d), which sets forth the guideline for assessing whether
government provision/purchase of goods is made “less/more than
adequate remuneration.”270 The Appellate Body ruled that while
the private prices in arm’s length transactions in the market of
provision provide the primary benchmark, such prices may be
replaced by an alternative benchmark if they are distorted because
the government plays a predominant role in providing those
goods. 271 In such circumstances, private suppliers would be
induced to align their prices to the government price.272 However,
government predominance in the market does not necessarily
mean all prices are distorted; hence, whether that predominance
has induced price alignment must be assessed on a case-by-case
basis. 273 The Appellate Body observed that alternative
benchmarks may include the prices of similar goods in world
markets (i.e., out-of-country benchmark) or proxies constructed
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on the basis of production costs (i.e., constructed benchmark).274
Where an alternative benchmark is employed, adjustments must
be made to ensure the benchmark reflects the prevailing market
conditions in the country of provision/purchase.275 These rulings,
which have been applied and further developed in subsequent
cases discussed below, suggest that the benefit/benchmark test
involves two major steps: (1) determining an appropriate
benchmark, and if an external benchmark is employed, 276 (2)
making adjustments to that benchmark to ensure it reflects the
prevailing conditions in the market of the subsidizing Member.
These two steps may pose challenges for the establishment of
“benefit conferred.”
The first step requires evidence to show that the primary
benchmark, such as prices of final goods or inputs or commercial
loan rates in the market of the subsidizing Member, is distorted
and hence needs to be replaced with an external benchmark. This
evidentiary requirement concerns whether the role of
governments in the market is so significant as to render the
primary benchmark distortive and unreliable. While governments
do play such a significant role in some markets, their role is less
significant in other markets. For example, in US – Anti-dumping
and Countervailing Duties (China), the WTO tribunal considered
whether the provision of hot-rolled steel (HRS) inputs to certain
Chinese HRS producers via SOEs conferred a benefit.277 For the
tribunal, the fact that the Chinese government accounted for 96.1%
of HRS production in China was sufficient to justify the use of
alternative benchmarks.278 The tribunal also found that the interest
rates for commercial loans in China were distorted based on the
totality of the following evidence: (1) the government’s influence
in the banking sector and on interest rates; (2) lending rates were
largely undifferentiated and close to the government-set
benchmark rate for most loans; (3) both domestic and foreign
274
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banks were subject to the same government controls; and (4) the
dominant role of State-owned banks in lending activities while
privately-owned banks only accounted for a very small percentage
of total lending.279 In making these findings, the Appellate Body
emphasized that it is price distortion that would allow the use of
alternative benchmarks, not the role of the government per se.280
It also clarified that the evidence required to prove such distortion
may vary depending on the degree of government intervention and
such intervention “does not refer exclusively to market shares, but
may also refer to market power.”281
These rulings suggest that in sectors in which private
actors are more significant than State actors, more compelling
evidence on market distortion would be needed. This would be the
case in China’s high-tech sectors, such as semiconductors, NEVs,
5G, big data, AI, etc. in which private firms have been increasing
both market shares and market power through myriads of
investments.282 This market situation, compared with the situation
in the industries dominated by State actors, such as steel, energy,
and resources, would entail a higher burden in substantiating that
the provision of goods or services or equity infusion by the private
entities is based on distorted terms and conditions due to
government influence. The potential difficulties in proving incountry price distortion may only increase if one considers the
general position of the Appellate Body that the circumstances that
279

Id. ¶¶ 503, 508.
Id. ¶ 446.
281
Id. ¶¶ 443–44.
282
Guanyu Fabu “2019 Nian Zhongguo Bandaoti Shi Da (Qiang) Qiye Mingdan”
De Gonggao ( 关 于 发 布 “2019 年 中 国 半 导 体 十 大 （ 强 ） 企 业 名 单 ” 的 公 告 )
[Announcement on Public Release “The Ten Most Competitive Chinese Companies in the
Semi-conductor Industry in 2019’], CSIA.NET (Aug. 27, 2020),
http://www.csia.net.cn/Article/ShowInfo.asp?InfoID=95565. (showing that private
companies have made up a significant portion in the sector, including design of integrated
circuit, semi-conductor manufacturing, semi-conductor testing and packaging, and semiconductor materials); see also China’s Top 10 Selling New Energy Cars, CHINA DAILY
(Oct. 12, 2018), www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201810/12/WS5bbfd4c5a310eff303281e78_4.
html. (showing that in the NEV sector, private companies such as BYD and Geely are
becoming the leaders in the market.); The Release of the Top 50 Chinese Big Data
Companies in 2020: Huawei, Alibaba and Tencent are Listed, EAST MONEY (Aug. 28,
2020), http://finance.eastmoney.com/a/202008281612258271.html. (showing that eight of
the top ten big data companies in China are privately-owned); Global Artificial Intelligence
Industry Whitepaper, DELOITTE (2020), https://www2.deloitte.com/cn/en/pages/technolo
gy-media-and-telecommunications/articles/global-ai-development-white-paper.html.
(showing that most of China’s high-growth AI firms are privately-owned).
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would permit the replacement of in-country private prices are
“very limited” under the ASCM,283 and consequently, there were
cases in which the use of an external benchmark was difficult to
justify even when a government held a monopolistic position in
the relevant market.284
The second step requires adjustments be made to a
selected external benchmark to reflect the prevailing market
conditions in the subsidizing Member. This requirement is
explicitly set out in Article 14(d) which contemplates certain
factors for adjustments including price, quality, availability,
marketability, transportation, and other conditions of purchase or
sale of goods or services in the country of provision or purchase.285
Such adjustments are also required under the other sub-paragraphs
of Article 14. For example, in US – Anti-dumping and
Countervailing Duties (China), the Appellate Body held that for
the purpose of Article 14(b) a benchmark may be employed if
“loans in a given market and in a given currency are distorted by
government intervention”; however, such a benchmark must be
adjusted to approximate “a comparable commercial loan which
the firm could actually obtain on the market”, taking into account
factors “such as date of origination, size, maturity, currency,
structure, or borrower’s credit risk.”286 The difficulties in making
these adjustments relate to how to ensure they reflect the
prevailing conditions of a market already so distorted by
government intervention as to render the terms and conditions of
private transactions in that market unreliable. In other words, if
the use of an out-of-country benchmark is intended to remove the
in-country market distortions, then making an adjustment to
reflect the in-country market conditions may reintroduce such
distortions into the benchmark, at least to some extent. In this
regard, the Appellate Body explained that “prevailing market
conditions” refer to the terms and conditions determined by
283
See. e.g., US — Countervailing Measures (Article 21.5 – China), supra note
213, ¶ 5.137.
284
See Qin, supra note 269, at 587–606 (discussing the findings in US — Softwood
Lumber IV, US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), and US — Carbon
Steel (India)).
285
ASCM, supra note 17, art. 14(d).
286
See US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), supra note 143,
¶¶ 484–86.
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market forces, which may include commercial activities of both
private and government-related entities.287 This confirms that the
adjustments would need to distinguish between market-based
terms and conditions and those distorted by government
intervention or even to establish a counterfactual market in the
absence of such distortions. To make it even worse, the Appellate
Body opined, in US – Softwood Lumber IV, that the adjustments
must reflect and maintain the comparative advantage of the
subsidizing Member so that countervailing measures are not
imposed to “offset differences in comparative advantages between
countries.” 288 While this is an enlightening remark, it tends to
make the legal requirements on the adjustments of benchmarks
even more obscure and difficult to apply and may drag WTO
Members into endless debate about what constitutes a
comparative advantage, to what extent such an advantage may be
created by governments, etc.289
These challenges associated with the application of the
benefit/benchmark test are, again, not specific to China but have
arisen in disputes between other WTO Members, as demonstrated
above. As far as China is concerned, these challenges may be
addressed through China’s WTO-plus commitment under Section
15(b) of the Accession Protocol. That provision states:
In proceedings under Parts II, III and V of the
SCM Agreement, when addressing subsidies
described in Articles 14(a), 14(b), 14(c) and 14(d),
relevant provisions of the SCM Agreement shall
apply; however, if there are special difficulties in
that application, the importing WTO Member
may then use methodologies for identifying and
measuring the subsidy benefit which take into
account the possibility that prevailing terms and
conditions in China may not always be available
as appropriate benchmarks. In applying such
methodologies, where practicable, the importing
WTO Member should adjust such prevailing
terms and conditions before considering the use
287
288
289

See US — Carbon Steel (India), supra note 93, ¶¶ 4.150–51.
See US — Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 83, ¶ 109.
See Qin, supra note 269, at 613–15.
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of terms and conditions prevailing outside
China.290
Although this provision has never been applied before, it arguably
has the potential to considerably soften the legal requirements for
the benchmark analysis, precisely in the two major steps.
In the first step, it provides the flexibility for investigating
authorities to employ an external benchmark if they find it
difficult to decide the magnitude of benefits by reference to the
terms and conditions in the Chinese market. The scope of “special
difficulties” is not circumscribed in any way, thereby leaving wide
latitude for authorities to decide that such difficulties exist.291 For
example, one may argue that given the massive government
investment fund in a particular high-tech sector, it would be
difficult to ascertain whether equity infusion by private entities is
based on terms and conditions unaffected by the activities of
governments. In any event, the evidentiary requirements under the
test of “special difficulties” would be much less onerous than
those under Article 14 of the ASCM.
In the second step, the obligation to adjust a selected
benchmark is reduced to a non-obligatory best-endeavours
requirement which merely encourages authorities to do so “where
practicable.” Like in the first step, no matter how the term
“practicable” is interpreted, it would be less onerous leaving room
for investigators to exercise discretion. Applying the example
above, if a “special difficulty” exists due to the involvement of the
government investment fund in a high-tech sector, the same
difficulty may be used to show that adjustments are not
“practicable” as it is practically difficult to identify undistorted
terms and conditions. Even in cases where China adduces
sufficient evidence to show that such adjustments are practically
doable, one would have to decide whether the best-endeavours
language should otherwise be mandatory. Overall, it is argued that
Section 15(b) of the Accession Protocol significantly relaxes the
high standards developed by WTO tribunals in determining
“benefits conferred”, thereby providing more flexibility for WTO

290
291

Accession Protocol, supra note 77, § 15(b) (emphasis added).
See Zhou et al., supra note 186, at 1015.
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Members to tackle Chinese subsidies through countervailing
actions.

E. Specificity
A subsidy that is not “prohibited” is not actionable or
countervailable unless it is “specific” within the meaning of
Article 2.292 This specificity requirement is intended to exclude
subsidies that are “broadly available and widely used throughout
an economy” from the ASCM. 293 The provision is essentially
concerned whether a subsidy is made available only to “certain
enterprises” or “geographical regions” in law or in fact, with a
focus on “limitations on eligibility.”294 Thus, a subsidy is de jure
specific if the access to or eligibility for it is explicitly limited to
certain enterprises. 295 In contrast, if the eligibility is automatic
based on objective criteria or conditions, then the subsidy is
ostensibly non-specific. 296 However, an ostensibly non-specific
subsidy may be found to be, in fact, specific in a particular case.297
De jure specificity would usually rely on a written instrument
whereas unwritten subsidies would typically trigger an inquiry
into de facto specificity.298 To establish de facto specificity, one
would need to demonstrate “a systematic series of actions
pursuant to which financial contributions that confer a benefit
have been provided to certain enterprises.”299 All evidence/factors
relating to “specificity” and “non-specificity” must be
considered.300
292
ASCM, supra note 17, art. 2.3 (deeming export subsidies and local content
subsidies “specific”).
293
Panel Report, United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WTO Doc.
WT/DS267/R (adopted Mar. 21, 2005), ¶ 7.1143.
294
See US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), supra note 143,
¶ 368.
295
ASCM, supra note 17, art. 2.1(a).
296
Id. art. 2.1(b).
297
Id. ¶ 367.
298
Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on
Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 2015),
¶ 4.129 [hereinafter US — Countervailing Measures (China)].
299
Id. ¶ 4.141.
300
See US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), supra note 143,
¶¶ 370–71.
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“Certain enterprises” include “an enterprise or industry or
group of enterprises or industries.”301 While an enterprise refers to
a firm or business, an industry generally “relates to producers of
certain products.”302 A subsidy is specific if eligible beneficiaries
are limited to “certain enterprises,” regardless of whether similar
subsidies are also granted to certain other enterprises.303 In US –
Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), for example,
the Appellate Body upheld the panel’s finding that the provision
of State loans by the Chinese government to the off-the-road
(OTR) tires industry was specific based on the following evidence:
(1) the Eleventh Five-Year Plan which set forth an overarching
initiative to support the auto parts industry; (2) the foreign
investment regime which categorized certain relevant projects in
the industry as “encouraged”, thereby directing government
support for those projects; and (3) corresponding planning
documents at local levels which explicitly mandated the grant of
policy loans to such projects.304 This finding of specificity was not
affected by the fact that these planning documents and the
“encouraged” category also encompassed other selected industries
or projects to which policy loans and other types of subsidies were
granted by central and local governments.305
Therefore, it would not be difficult to establish that many
of China’s high-tech subsidies discussed above are de jure specific.
The relevant national policy documents, such as the Five-Year
plans, MIC 2025, and their implementing regulatory instruments
at both national and local levels, explicitly set out the priority
sectors and projects and the development goals and direct the
provision of a variety of financial contributions to these sectors.
For instance, these policies have led to the creation and continuous
expansion of the government investment funds to which only
enterprises in the selected sectors are eligible. Likewise, the
preferential tax treatment for HNTEs and for R&D activities in
general, as discussed in Section III.A(2) above, is also specific.
301
302

ASCM, supra note 17, art. 2.1.
See US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), supra note 143,

¶ 373.
See EC — Aircraft, supra note 263, ¶ 949.
See US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), supra note 143,
¶¶ 386–400.
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303
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While eligibility for the preferential treatment is assessed based
on certain criteria and conditions, one of the criteria explicitly
requires an applicant to undertake R&D in one of the priority hightech sectors. Where such preferential treatment is applied at local
levels, it may be regionally specific.
Regional specificity concerns the eligibility for a subsidy
being limited to “certain enterprises” in a designated geographical
region. This type of specificity merely requires that a subsidy be
limited to a designated region without the need to establish further
that it is also limited to a subset of enterprises within the region.306
Thus, a national subsidy provided to a region is specific even
though it is made available to all enterprises in the region. In
contrast, a subsidy granted by a local government to enterprises
throughout its jurisdiction—i.e., not limited to a specific segment
of the local jurisdiction—would not be regionally specific. 307
Thus, to the extent that China’s high-tech subsidies are provided
by a local government to enterprises in the selected sectors in its
entire jurisdiction, such subsidies would be enterprise/industryspecific, not regionally specific.
Complexities may arise where the designated area is a
segment of a local jurisdiction. In US – Anti-dumping and
Countervailing Duties (China), the panel considered the provision
of land-use rights to certain enterprises in an Industrial Park within
the jurisdiction of a local government in China (the Huantai
County). 308 It ruled that a designated geographical region may
encompass “any identified tract of land within the jurisdiction of
a granting authority” and hence the Industrial Park.309 However,
the panel observed that the subsidy is not specific just because the
land was physically located in the designated area. Further
evidence was required to show that the land-use rights in the area
constituted a “distinct regime” for the provision of that financial
contribution compared with the general provision of land-use
306
See EC — Aircraft, supra note 89, ¶ 7.1223; Panel Report, United States —
Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China,
WTO Doc. WT/DS379/R (adopted Mar. 25, 2011), ¶ 9.135 [hereinafter US — AntiDumping and Countervailing Duties (China)].
307
See US — Countervailing Measures (China), supra note 298, ¶ 4.165.
308
See US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), supra note 306,
¶ 9.140.
309
Id. ¶¶ 9.140–9.144, 9.156.
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rights by the local government in its jurisdiction. In this regard,
the panel suggested that the subsidy may not be regionally specific
if “all purchasers of land-use rights throughout the jurisdiction of
the granting authority paid exactly the same below-market price
for land.”310 As shown in Section III.A(3), industrial parks, hightech zones, and the like are widespread in local jurisdictions in
China. According to the case law discussed above, the fact that
these zones constitute designated areas and that subsidies are
provided to these areas is insufficient to prove regional specificity.
A further step must be taken to show that a subsidy program
provided to such a segment of a jurisdiction is distinct. In practical
terms, this program would be distinct if it is only available to the
designated area or offers preferential terms and conditions
compared to those provided to enterprises outside the area. This
further step would not be a hurdle to establishing that China’s
high-tech subsidies are regionally specific. For example, the
provision of land-use rights and energy inputs to designated areas
by local governments is typically based on preferential rates
compared to the standard rates applicable in the relevant
jurisdictions. This has to do with the fact that these areas are
created to fulfill the policy objectives and mandates envisaged by
the central government and more specifically to promote the
growth of the priority sectors within the jurisdictions according to
local strengths and advantages. Thus, these subsidies constitute a
distinct regime and are regionally specific.
Where there is no written instrument, difficulties may
arise in establishing de facto specificity. The case law requires the
demonstration of “a systematic series of actions” pointing to “the
existence of an unwritten ‘subsidy programme.’”311 Recall that the
US – Countervailing Measures (China) dispute involved the
provision of production inputs such as HRS by Chinese SOEs to
downstream industries for less than adequate remuneration. Due
to the lack of any written instrument creating such a subsidy
program, the US authority found these alleged subsidies to be de
facto specific in a range of countervailing investigations.312 While
310
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these findings were endorsed by the panel in the original
proceedings, the Appellate Body rejected the panel’s ruling that
the consistent provision of the relevant input by the SOEs was
sufficient to show the existence of “a systematic series of
actions.”313 However, the Appellate Body was unable to complete
the analysis for lack of factual findings, leaving the issue of de
facto specificity unresolved.314 In the compliance proceedings, the
Appellate Body, in upholding the findings of the compliance panel,
elaborated that de facto specificity cannot be established merely
based on “repeated transactions” but requires an assessment of
how such transactions have constituted “a systematic subsidy
programme.” 315 In its findings of de facto specificity, the US
authority merely requested information on the industry providing
the relevant input and the number of recipients for three and four
years respectively, without explaining how such information
substantiated the existence of an unwritten subsidy programme.316
Only during the compliance proceedings had the US adduced
additional evidence relating to various Chinese policy mandates
leading to the provision of the relevant input for nearly 50 years.
Both the compliance panel and the Appellate Body regarded the
additional evidence as “an ex post rationale” and refused to accept
it. 317 In any event, the Appellate Body stressed that the existence
of such policy mandates, in itself, would not suffice and “a
reasoned and adequate explanation” must be provided to show the
existence of “a systematic subsidy programme.”318
Thus, compared with de jure specificity, the showing of
de facto specificity requires a higher evidentiary standard and
level of analysis. This in turn makes it more difficult for
investigating authorities to tackle hidden or unwritten subsidies
through countervailing measures. Although this difficulty applies
to all WTO Members, China’s longstanding practice of using
SOEs to supply input at low costs to selected sectors has

313
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315
See US — Countervailing Measures (Article 21.5 – China), supra note 213,
¶¶ 5.231–5.233.
316
Id. ¶ 5.237.
317
Id. ¶¶ 5.240–5.241.
318
Id. ¶¶ 5.219, 5.240.
314

532

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 30 NO. 3

understandably generated considerable concerns.319 However, one
may argue that at the end of US – Countervailing Measures
(China), the Appellate Body was no longer concerned about the
sufficiency of evidence after the US had provided the additional
information in the compliance proceedings. Such information was
not accepted by the WTO tribunals simply because it did not form
the basis of US findings of de facto specificity in its countervailing
investigations. In contrast, the remaining concern of the Appellate
Body seems to be the lack of “a reasoned and adequate
explanation” that links the various policy documents to the
existence of an unwritten subsidy program.320 Admittedly, more
guidance is needed to fully understand the degree of explanation
required. As far as China’s high-tech sector is concerned, it would
not be unreasonably difficult to offer such an explanation. The
relevant evidence would include the existence of numerous policy
documents that explicitly direct all governments to support the
selected high-tech sectors, the dominant role of SOEs in the
critical upstream industries, and the wide-ranging subsidies
granted to these SOEs to enable them to supply lower-priced input
for production. 321 In reality, authorities may well utilize the
ambiguities and hence flexibilities left by the US – Countervailing
Measures (China) decision to treat the provision of production
input by Chinese SOEs for less than adequate remuneration as
being specific. Such practice has been widely adopted in

319
For instance, Chinese SOEs have provided stable supply of alumina, a key input
to electronics products, at below-market or even below-cost prices to local companies. See
OECD Aluminum Report, supra note 172, at 93. Chinese steel SOEs also have received
government subsidies over the years, which have enabled them to supply low-priced steel
products to downstream industries, such as high-end equipment manufacturing. See Yibo
Zhao (赵毅波), Zhaoyibo Ju Kui Bao Gang Niannei Huo 17 Yi Zhengfu Buzhu Fenxi Cheng
Duanqi Nei Zishen Niukui Wuwang (巨亏包钢年内获 17 亿政府补助 分析称短期内自
身扭亏无望) [Profits-Losing BaoSteel Received RMB 1.7 Billion Government Subsidies
and Analysis Points Out the Lack of Chance in Stop Losing on Its Own], SINA FINANCE
(Dec. 30, 2015), http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/2015-12-30/docifxmxxst0778361.shtml.
320
See US — Countervailing Measures (Article 21.5 – China), supra note 213,
¶ 5.241.
321
See, e.g., OECD Aluminum Report, supra note 172; MORRISON & TANG, supra
note 172, at 13–14; Julia Ya Qin, WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises
(SOEs) — A Critical Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 7(4) J. INT. ECON. LAW
863, 875–82 (2004).
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numerous countervailing investigations against China. 322 More
often than not, authorities have also resorted to concurrent antidumping actions to address the market distortion and adverse
impact caused by Chinese subsidies on domestic industries.323
In addition, one may argue that the source of the
distortions lies in the subsidies and preferential treatment provided
to SOEs which enables them to supply production input for less
than adequate remuneration. Therefore, one way to deal with the
subsidies to downstream industries would be to address the source
of the problem, that is, to push China to reduce or remove the
subsidies to SOEs. In this regard, Section 10.2 of China’s
Accession Protocol allows WTO Members to deem Chinese
subsidies to SOEs as being “specific” if the SOEs “are the
predominant recipients of such subsidies or . . . receive
disproportionately large amounts of such subsidies.” Given the
dominant role of SOEs in the upstream industries mentioned
above and the large amount of subsidies they receive, this WTOplus commitment would mean that any subsidies provided to
SOEs in these sectors would be “specific.”324 More broadly, as
discussed in Section III.A(3), paragraph 46 of the Working Party
Report requires Chinese SOEs and SIEs to make purchases and
sales solely based on commercial considerations. It may be argued
that the longstanding and consistent practice of Chinese SOEs and
SIEs selling input to selected downstream industries for less than
adequate remuneration precluded them from making reasonable
returns that would generally be expected in commercial
transactions. This obligation, therefore, provides an extra tool to
address the problem concerned without the need to resort to the
ASCM and thereby avoids the potential difficulties in establishing
de facto specificity.
F. Concluding Remarks
In summary, the ASCM does not cover all kinds of
government actions, especially those which may be regarded as
indirect subsidization. However, the scope of “financial
322

See generally NON-MARKET ECONOMIES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM:
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323
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contributions” is apparently broad enough to capture the major
subsidies in China’s high-tech sector. Government measures, such
as export restraints, VAT rebates, regulatory preferences or
incentives, that seem to fall outside the reach of the ASCM are
used widely in the high-tech and other industries across many
jurisdictions and may cause market distortions detrimental to
trading partners.325 Other existing WTO rules, including China’s
WTO-plus obligations, should be employed to tackle these
measures and distortions more directly. Likewise, contrary to the
dominant view that the existing WTO rules are inadequate to
tackle Chinese subsidies, the other major legal conditions (i.e.,
public body, entrusted or directed private body, benefits conferred
and specificity) which must be satisfied for a financial
contribution to be actionable or countervailable are not so difficult
to establish either. Where difficulties may arise when trying to
establish these conditions, they generally apply to all WTO
Members. 326 If anything, China’s WTO-plus obligations have
provided important additional discipline on Chinese subsidies,
and market-distortive behaviour and conduct more broadly,
leaving significantly less policy space for China. Since these extra
rules have been strikingly under-utilized to date, the claim that the
current rules are inadequate is unpersuasive and misleading.
Finally, where new and better rules may be needed, they can only
be created by WTO Members through negotiations, not by WTO
tribunals through adjudication.
III. FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL SUBSIDY REGULATION
As an essential policy tool, industrial subsidies were on
the rise before the pandemic and have become even more crucial
325
See generally OECD Semiconductor Report, supra note 105; OECD Aluminum
Report, supra note 172.
326
One may remain concerned about the high evidentiary burden that may result
from China’s non-transparent system. However, this whole section has shown that China’s
major high-tech subsidies are not provided in such a non-transparent manner as widely
observed and hence are not so difficult to challenge under the ASCM and other WTO rules
including China-specific rules. In addition, one should also note that Article 13.1 of WTO’s
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes requires a
disputing party to provide information requested by the panel promptly and fully. See
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 13.1,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401. This may permit the panel to draw an adverse inference if such
information is not provided in the required manner. We thank Simon Lester for this insight.
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as governments around the globe pursue economic recovery. 327
There is, therefore, a growing and imminent need for governments
to find a way to address the detrimental effects of subsidies on
trade and avoid tit-for-tat subsidization. There are at least three
options. One is for each government to unilaterally reduce or
remove the pandemic-induced subsidies as they become
dispensable. This option, however, will unlikely affect subsidies
less related to the pandemic such as those in high-tech industries.
The second option would be for governments to challenge these
subsidies at the WTO. While this option may cover all industrial
subsidies regardless of whether they are pandemic-related, it may
not be effective in the absence of a functioning Appellate Body as
losing parties may simply ‘appeal into the void,’ which would
gradually disincentivize governments from resorting to the
dispute settlement mechanism.328 There is, therefore, an urgency
for WTO Members to revive the Appellate Body. In the case of
China, the dispute settlement mechanism proved effective in
enforcing compliance and influencing domestic policymaking and
even prompted gradual and systematic adjustments of China’s
complex regulatory regime.329 However, if the other major players
continue to abuse the right of appeal to avoid binding decisions
and implementation, it will become increasingly difficult to use
the system to push China to reduce or remove trade-distortive
subsidies. 330 The third option is negotiation which may start
327
See Dessie Ambaw et al., Lessons from the Pandemic for Future WTO Subsidy
Rules, in REVITALISING MULTILATERALISM: PRAGMATIC IDEAS FOR THE NEW WTO
DIRECTOR-GENERAL 203, 203–08 (2020); LISA MCGUIRK ET AL., THE USE OF INDUSTRIAL
SUBSIDIES BY MAJOR ECONOMIES: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL BOARD OF TRADE SWEDEN 10, 14 (2020).
328
See generally Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Dispute Settlement Post 2019: What to
Expect?, 22(3) J. INT. ECON. LAW 297, 297 (2019).
329
See generally ZHOU, supra note 153.
330
For example, the US, in two recent cases, ‘appealed into the void’ a panel ruling
against the trade war tariffs it imposed on China and another panel ruling against its antisubsidy tariffs on softwood lumber originated in Canada, both of which were found in
breach of WTO rule. See Statements by the United States at the October 26, 2020, DSB
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among major economies to lay the groundwork for more inclusive
negotiations at the multilateral level. To do so, governments will
need to leverage the impacts of the pandemic and the global
(ab)use of subsidies to generate sufficient political will for change.
Despite the difficulties in such negotiations and the time they may
take, this is the only way to address any perceived deficiencies in
the current subsidy rules. Thus, the rest of this section, seeks to
develop some general principles and approaches for future
negotiations of industrial subsidies after a brief discussion of the
major proposals in the literature.
Existing proposals for the reform of WTO subsidy rules
largely reflect the competing interests between strengthening the
current rules and preserving policy space. One major proposal
calling for more onerous discipline is the latest US-EU-Japan joint
statement released on 14 January 2020. 331 Amongst others, the
joint statement proposes to expand the list of prohibited subsidies,
specify the circumstances in which external benchmarks may be
used for the determination of “benefit conferred,” and reverse the
Appellate Body’s “authority/function-based” approach to “public
body.” We have discussed why the current laws on the use of
external benchmarks and the determination of “public body” are
not inadequate to address Chinese subsidies in the high-tech sector
in Section III. This discussion is applicable to subsidies in other
Chinese industries. As regards the proposed prohibited subsidies,
the joint statement is concerned about only a few selected types of
subsidies: unlimited guarantees, subsidies aiming to rescue an
insolvent enterprise or to finance an enterprise in sectors or
industries in overcapacity, and certain direct forgiveness of
debt.332 The fundamental problem in this proposal is the lack of
any rationale for the treatment of the selected subsidies more
strictly than other subsidies. This problem has to do with the fact
anti-dumping actions against Russia. See Notification of an Appeal by the European Union,
European Union — Cost Adjustment Methodologies and Certain Anti-Dumping Measures
on Imports from Russia (Second Complaint), WTO Doc. WT/DS494/7 (Sept. 1, 2020).
These abuses would undermine the effectiveness of the system and incentivize other major
players like China to do the same to avoid unfavorable decisions.
331
See 2020 Joint Statement, supra note 15; see also Robert Howse, Making the
WTO (Not So) Great Again: The Case Against Responding to the Trump Trade Agenda
Through Reform of WTO Rules on Subsidies and State Enterprises, 23(2) J. INT. ECON.
LAW 371 (2020).
332
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that the joint statement targets China and hence some of the
Chinese subsidies that have attracted considerable criticisms. 333
As such, this proposal has ignored many other equally or even
more controversial subsidies in the economies of other WTO
Members including the parties to the joint statement. Another
major problem of this proposal is the lack of consideration of the
policy space needed for governments to use the named subsidies
for legitimate regulatory goals. Future negotiations will need to
address subsidies in the economies of all negotiating parties in
ways that strike a balance between further regulation of subsidies
and protection of legitimate use of subsidies.
In contrast, proposals of developing countries in the Doha
round have gone in the opposite direction calling for more policy
space by reintroducing non-actionable subsidies.334 More recently,
China’s proposal on WTO reforms also sought to reinstate and
expand the coverage of non-actionable subsidies as a way to curb
the abuse of countervailing measures. 335 In line with these
proposals, leading commentators put forward recommendations
for developing an improved mechanism to provide sufficient room
for the application of subsidies for environmental,336 R&D,337 and
other legitimate goals, particularly those envisaged under the preexisting non-actionable scheme. 338 These proposals speak
strongly to the importance of maintaining flexibility for the use of
subsidies in pursuit of legitimate regulatory goals and the need to
broaden the scope of permitted subsidies.339
Drawing on our discussions so far, we put forward three
general principles for future negotiations of subsidy rules. First,
the negotiations must not be disproportionately focused on China
333
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and instead must focus on addressing trade-distortive subsidies in
all economies involved. Given the widespread use of industrial
subsidies, a China-focus would be perceived by China as
discriminatory treatment, thereby adding unnecessary
complexities to the already difficult negotiations and undermining
the chances of reaching a positive outcome.
Second, the negotiations need to strike a balance between
tightening the regulation of subsidies and maintaining the
flexibility to use subsidies for legitimate policy objectives. As
mentioned in Section III and argued in detail elsewhere, the
Theory of Distortions and Welfare provides well-established
economic guidance for how to achieve this balance.340 In essence,
the theory establishes that for trade liberalization to remain
welfare-enhancing, trade rules must allow governments the
freedom to address their own domestic externalities or nonprotectionist policy goals. However, the theory suggests that the
policy instruments that governments employ to achieve a chosen
goal would need to be regulated. In this regard, the theory ranks
different policy instruments according to their economic
efficiency and develops the Targeting Rule whereby the efficiency
of an instrument enhances as it tackles the chosen objective more
closely. This general rule is subject to the by-product costs
associated with the use of an optimal instrument. For instance,
while direct subsidization tends to be an optimal means to address
domestic externalities on many occasions, it may become suboptimal as the costs of disbursement may outweigh the efficiency
gains generated by the use of subsidies as opposed to other
means.341 These propositions suggest that one way to distinguish
“good” and “bad” subsidies, from an economic perspective, would
be to inquiry into whether a chosen subsidy targets a given
objective directly at the source and if not, why a sub-optimal
subsidy is adopted, taking into account the effectiveness of the
subsidies in pursuing the objective and their by-product costs. For
example, if the externality concerns the lack of consumption of
certain goods or an objective to stimulate that consumption, then
340
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a subsidy to consumers would be generally more efficient than
other types of subsidies. Where the externality concerns an
inefficient capital market or an objective to promote finance for
R&D, then a direct subsidization (e.g., in the form of tax
incentives) in the capital market would be preferable. Overall, the
significance of the theory lies in the distinction between policy
objectives and policy instruments and the emphasis on regulating
the latter while leaving room for consideration of the effectiveness
and reasonable availability of less efficient means. In doing so, the
theory also offers a way to discipline protectionist use of subsidies
without unduly impairing the capacity of governments to use
subsidies for legitimate goals.342
Third, while the negotiations should generally follow the
economic guidance above, they need to pursue an outcome that is
politically achievable. In subsidy negotiations, as shown in
Section III, governments may be more concerned about the
impacts of a foreign subsidy on their domestic industries than the
welfare effects of the subsidy. Recently, two major proposals have
stressed the need to target subsidies with negative spillover effects
from a global perspective.343 To do so, however, governments will
need to be provided with sufficient data and other information to
assess the actual or potential global welfare effects of numerous
types of subsidies. And even if such data is made available,
governments would be likely to remain more concerned about the
impacts of subsidies on domestic industries as opposed to their
global welfare effects. In addition, just like negotiations in other
areas of trade, future subsidy negotiations will necessarily leave
some trade-distortive subsidies un-addressed or under-addressed
for political reasons. Taken together, the above means that reforms
of subsidy rules will be affected by political considerations,
although it is advisable for negotiators to follow the economic
guidance and data and will only progress incrementally.
Considering the principles above, we propose the
following general approaches to future negotiations of industrial
342
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subsidies. Governments should be allowed to choose their own
policy objectives but should be asked to provide information
about the objective(s) behind an existing or potential subsidy. In
this regard, Article 25.3(iii) of the ASCM already requires WTO
Members to do so in their notifications of subsidies, which could
be used as a basis for the negotiations. The identification of policy
objectives is necessary for a discussion about whether a subsidy is
the optimal means to pursue a given objective and if not, whether
it is because an optimal subsidy is not reasonably available so that
a different type of subsidy is needed. This discussion will also
involve consideration of the impact of a subsidy on trading
partners, its global welfare effects, and political implications for
both subsidizing and affected foreign countries. Through this
approach, the outcome of negotiations would reflect a balance
which allows room for governments to use economically
preferable and politically feasible subsidies for any preferred
objectives while at the same time reducing the impacts of these
subsidies on trading partners.
To enhance the achievability of a political compromise, it
is necessary for the negotiations to deviate from the conventional
approach to the regulation of industrial subsidies whereby all
governments are subject to the same set of rules on, inter alia,
prohibited and non-actionable subsidies and the conditions for the
use of non-actionable subsidies including the magnitude of such
subsidies. Instead, the negotiations must recognize that each
country has different regulatory priorities/needs and different
economic, political, and social situations and constraints in terms
of the use of subsidies, the level of support, etc. especially in the
post-pandemic era. While the conventional approach may still be
used to set out rules that are generally applicable, it must be
supplemented by an approach that allows country-specific
commitments and exceptions. For this purpose, the negotiations
should adopt a scheduling approach to produce an Industrial
Subsidy Schedule for each country. This approach is nothing new
to the WTO and has already been adopted in negotiations of tariff
concessions and commitments in trade in services, although it may
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be more complex for subsidy negotiations. 344 An Industrial
Subsidy Schedule should set out the sectors that may require
subsidization, the objective(s) that a subsidy serves, the magnitude
of subsidies (which may include an upper limit and/or a phasedown or phase-out period), and any foreseeable circumstances in
which similar or new subsidies may need to be re-introduced or
the magnitude may need to be increased. To give effect to the
schedule, a provision will need to be added to the ASCM to
require governments not to grant subsidies that go beyond their
scheduled commitments. A provision on renegotiation of the
commitments or modification of schedules would also be
desirable.
In addition, governments should have the right to use
subsidies for legitimate policy objectives that are commonly
accepted. This requires an additional provision in the ASCM to
explicitly allow recourse to the general exceptions and security
exceptions set out in GATT Articles XX and XXI. 345 This
provision may simply reproduce Article 3 of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measure 346 which states: “All
exceptions under GATT 1994 shall apply, as appropriate, to the
provisions of this Agreement.” This addition is important and
necessary as it would ensure that the exceptions are consistently
applied to different kinds of policy instruments and would
incentivize governments to use subsidies, as opposed to less
efficient and more trade-restrictive means, such as quantitative
restrictions and tariffs, for these regulatory goals.
Finally, it is worth noting that our proposals are not
intended to cover all aspects of future negotiations on industrial
subsidies. For example, there is a need for discussions about how
to measure negative cross-border spill-over effects of subsidies
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and develop international rules on competitive neutrality,347 and
for an improvement of subsidy notifications and transparency.
Our purpose is to contribute to the ongoing discussions of how
best to re-invigorate and facilitate international cooperation on the
regulation of industrial subsidies.
CONCLUSION
For decades, the multilateral trading system played a
critical role in promoting international cooperation on trade
policymaking, dispute resolution, and made significant
contributions to maintaining peace and prosperity for the
international community. Amongst other factors, China’s rise has
caused growing concerns about whether the system is effective
and should remain relevant. These concerns led to dramatic trade
policy changes in the United States, with the United States taking
unilateral actions against China and strangulating multilateral
cooperation while in the meantime calling for reforms of the WTO.
While the outbreak of COVID-19 intensified the crisis in the
multilateral trading system, none of these China-related concerns
are caused by the pandemic and will not subside with it.
China’s economic growth relied heavily on industrial
policies and subsidies which have been increasingly applied to
foster China’s technological capability, indigenous innovation,
and global competitiveness. US unilateral actions have proven to
be futile and will remain so if the purpose is to fundamentally
change China’s economic model or curb its technological
advancement.348 Like all other countries, China should and has
every right to upgrade its economic growth model and promote
innovation and digital transformation. Whether China has done so
in ways that violate its international obligations must be assessed
by WTO tribunals based on evidence and detailed legal
examination rather than by unsubstantiated allegations. Likewise,
whether new rules may be needed to deal with China requires a
careful assessment of the existing rules and jurisprudence, and
347
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eventually must be determined by all WTO Members via
negotiations. Both the negotiation of new rules and the
adjudication of trade disputes require a functional system for
international cooperation which China has consistently advocated
for.349 Therefore, it is reasonable to anticipate that only through
the multilateral approach, rather than unilateral actions, may one
effectively address so-called ‘China issues,’ including industrial
policies and subsidies. Fortunately, there seem to be some positive
signs of moves in this direction under the Biden Administration.350
Although China’s industrial policies and subsidies have
been at the core of the US’s concerns and global trade policy
debate, such policies are widely used by all economies for a
variety of domestic regulatory goals. Both the application of the
current WTO rules on subsidies and the development of new rules
in the future must strike a balance between regulating tradedistortive subsidies and protecting policy space for the legitimate
use of subsidies. In this regard, one must note that China’s WTO
obligations have extended significantly beyond the general WTO
rules and have the potential to constrain Chinese industrial
subsidies and government intervention in the economy more
broadly. The efficacy of most of these China-specific rules has
remained untested to date. Yet, the view that the current rules are
inadequate to tackle Chinese subsidies has (unjustifiably)
dominated the international trade community.
Using China’s subsidization in the high-tech sector as an
illustration, we have challenged this dominant view by showing
that even the general WTO rules on subsidies do not create any
substantive hurdles to tackling the major types of Chinese
technology subsidies. Where difficulties may arise in a few
circumstances, these are not specific to China but generally apply
to all WTO Members. In addition, the China-specific rules are
349
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drafted in a broad manner so as to provide not only flexibilities to
overcome these difficulties but also extra tools to constrain other
modes of state intervention that may adversely affect the interests
of China’s trading partners. Given China’s good record of
compliance with WTO rulings, one should be optimistic about
using the dispute settlement system to push China to reduce or
remove subsidies and other WTO-illegal laws and practices. This,
however, will be difficult to achieve in the absence of a functional
Appellate Body. 351 Although we have focused on technology
subsidies in this paper, our discussions and observations may be
applied to other industrial policies and subsidies in China.
Faced with the widespread and increasing use of
industrial subsidies triggered by the pandemic, policymakers,
scholars, and other stakeholders have been developing
mechanisms for international cooperation. To contribute to this
discussion, we put forward some general principles and
approaches for future negotiations of industrial subsidies
emphasizing the need to target trade-distortive subsidies rather
than China, to balance between strengthening subsidy rules and
preserving policy space, to follow economic guidance and data
while accommodating political considerations, and most
innovatively, to shift from the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to a
country-specific approach through a scheduling method whereby
an Industrial Subsidy Schedule is created to record policy
objectives, commitments, and exceptions of each nation. Our
recommendations are not intended to be exhaustive, but to
develop ideas that may facilitate international cooperation on
industrial subsidies.
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